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Long before living memory our ancestral way of life produced
outstanding men, and those excellent men preserved the old way
of life and the institutions of their forefathers. Our generation,

however, after inheriting our political organization like a
magnificent picture now fading with age, not only neglected to

restore its original colours but did not even bother to ensure that it
retained its basic form and, as it were, its faintest outlines.
- Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Republic'
1. INTRODUCTION

The ancient Greeks called it nomos.2 The Romans embraced it as mores
majorum, the ancestral ways that Cicero described.3 Most significantly, Burke

championed it as the principle of prescription, the obligation to respect and
maintain the "slow and patient product[s] of reason dealing with the evolving
complexity of human affairs." 4 Whatever its label, tradition has long been a vital
ingredient in the creation and development of jurisprudence and the human
understanding of law. In like manner, as Tocqueville recognized, the United States
Constitution itself bears the imprimatur of centuries of trial and continuity, drawing
on the practices and lessons of many great cultures, such as Athens, Rome, and, in
particular, London.5 Accordingly, the use of tradition as a method for guiding the
1

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, THE REPUBLIC 81 (Niall Rudd, trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (54

B C.) [hereinafter REPUBLIC].
2

See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 8 (1992).

As explained further

mnfra, Part 11,Minister Kelly notes that nomos ultimately had more than a single connotation but was the most
common understanding of"law" as we know it. Id.
See RUSSELL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 102 (3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter ROOTS OF
AMERICAN ORDER]. Professor Kirk's work in this area is highly regarded, particularly for its revival of
Burkean political theory, and this article relies liberally upon it.
3

4

Francis Canavan, S.J., Kirk and the Burke Revival, 30 INTERCOLL. REV. 43, 45 (1994). See also

EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 33-34 (L.G. Mitchell, ed., Oxford Univ.

Press, 1993) (1790) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS] (detailing Burke's principle of prescription as applied to
political affairs); RUSSELL KIRK, THE POLITICS OF PRUDENCE 19 (1993) [hereinafter POLITICS OF PRUDENCE]
(restating Burke's principle of prescription and arguing that, as Burke insisted, "[t]he individual is foolish but
the species is wise. . . . we do well to abide by precedent and precept and even prejudice, for the great
mysterious incorporation of the human race has acquired a prescriptive wisdom far greater than any man's
petty private rationality.").
See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 113-14 (George Lawrence, trans.,
Harper Perennial Books 1969) (1848). See also RUSSELL KIRK, RIGHTS AND DUTIES 4 (1997) [hereinafter
RIGHTS AND DUTIES] ("[t]he Constitution of the United States was and is rooted in the experience and the
thought of earlier times.... Deeply rooted, like some immense tree, the American Constitution grew out of a
century and a half of civil social order in North America and more than seven centuries of British
experience."); JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT

60 (C. Gordon Post, ed., Hackett

Publishing, 1953) (explaining that "[a] constitution, to succeed, must spring from the bosom of the
community and be adapted to the intelligence and character of the people and all the multifarious relations,
internal and external, which distinguish one people from another."). It is true that Calhoun's Disquisition
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improvement (albeit gradual) of constitutional law has played an indispensable role
in America since the framing.6

What are our traditions? Professor Kirk explains that American traditions,
few of which originated here, are our "prescriptive social habits, prejudices,
customs, and political usages which most people accept with little question, as an
intellectual legacy from their ancestors." 7 Among these are, for example, belief in a
"spiritual order which in some fashion governs our mundane order;" 8 selfgovernment; the significance of private personal rights; the value of marriage and
family. 9 But tradition is, and may be, much more than these. Traditions, by
definition, ought never to be confused with ideology, or abstraction, but rather are
the product of prudence. 10 Traditions thus are organic, originating not with the
dictates of the sovereign but growing from the mores and continuity of political
communities." They include social and political practices, including legislative and
included portions designed to advance his defense of slavery. Nevertheless, to appreciate Calhoun's wisdom
as a political thinker and actor, one must go beyond his unfortunate position on slavery, giving careful
attention to his thoughtful treatment of human nature, the structure of government, and the development of

sound constitutions.
6

See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 6, at 57 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)

("[I]et experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to"); No. 20, at 138 (James
Madison and Alexander Hamilton) ("[elxperience is the oracle of truth").
RUSSELL KIRK, BEYOND THE DREAMS OF AVARICE 63 (1991).
8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id, See also Daniel C.K. Chow, A PragmaticModel of Law, 67 WASH. L. REV. 755, 786-790

(1992) (explaining the virtue of prudence as an essential element in the development of a coherentist
epistemology that rejects foundationalism and instead urges respect for traditions, which are antifoundationalist cultural constructs).
But see Robert L. Hayman Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and Postmodern
ConstitutionalTraditionalism,30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 72 n. 1 (1995) (explaining Professor Chow's
theory and concluding that "it is difficult to see how the conservative respect for positive traditions is
anything other than foundationalist, even if it is accompanied by the quite unremarkable recognition that
traditions are culturally constructed."). Professor Hayman continues, "[w]hen no better reason is offered - or
needed - for following 'tradition' other than the declaration that it is, then 'tradition' seems to be a foundation
just as surely as any metaphysical principle." Id. Professor Hayman's point is well-taken, and it seems, quite
correct. One need not necessarily indulge an assumption, however, that the justifications for tradition are
only that "it is." Rather, this is one among many elements of a tradition-based epistemology. As Professor
Pelikan explains,
tradition derives some of its vindication from the sheer fact of its existence, "just
because its there," as the clichd about mountain climbing says. Coming to terms with
the presence of the traditions from which we are derived is, or should be, a fundamental
part of the process of growing up . . . . We do, nevertheless, have some choices to
make. One ... is whether to understand our origins in our tradition or merely to let that
tradition work on us without understanding it, in short, whether to be conscious
participants or unconscious victims. Once understood, the tradition ... does confront us
with a further choice . . . : the choice between recovery and rejection, with a range of
possibilities that combine partial recovery with partial rejection.
JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 53 (1984).
11

See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedentand Tradition, 99 YALE L. J. 1029, 1054 (1990). But see
David J. Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1040 (1991) (arguing that Professor
Kronman's defense of tradition is indefensible because traditionalism itself is indefensible).
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juridical practices, 12 as well as systems of beliefs.13 While they can exclude (for
example, customs that prevented the races from enjoying equally the privileges of
citizenship), they also can harmonize, eschewing moral and social isolation.14
Traditions evolve and are subject to modification or even rejection, 5 but always
serve1 6 as reminders that our future improvement is linked inextricably with our
past.

Thanks in large measure to the interpretational method of one man, in
particular - Justice Antonin Scalia - tradition now plays as central a role as ever in
the judicial interpretation of our Constitution. Although generally regarded, and in
fact described by himself, as a textualist,17 Justice Scalia nonetheless seeks the
guidance of tradition to inform the constitutional text. For Justice Scalia, tradition
possesses both a substantive and limiting element as applied to judging.
Substantively, tradition places on the constitutional text the imprint of historical
context as represented in the gradual accumulation of time-honored practices. 18
Moreover, by linking text and tradition, which for Justice Scalia must be identified
at the most specific level available, judges are constrained, less likely to roam in
the constitutional field and more likely to defer to republican judgments, to
"principles adhered to, over time, by the American people, rather than those
favored by the personal . . . philosophical dispositions of a majority of this
Court." 19 Thus, Scalia's traditionalism both gives life to the Constitution and

12

On the authority ofjudicial precedent as a form of tradition-based analysis, see Frederick Shauer,

Precedent,39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987). Schauer offers several justifications for the authority of precedent,
including fairness (that all like cases be treated alike); predictability (easing the process of planning and
organizing one's life); "strengthened decision-making" (conserving "decisional resources and "dampening
variablility"). Id. at 595-600. See also Kronman, supranote 11,at 1037-38 (explaining Professor Schauer's
view of precedent and explaining that Professor Schauer's arguments are both utilitarian and deontological).
13

See W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF 66-67 (2d ed. 1978) (explaining that

knowledge derives from an intricate web of beliefs, and that prudence counsels respect for those beliefs and
existing social structures).
14
See Hayman, supra note 10, at 74. Professor Hayman explains that "conventional traditionalism.
•. has systematically excluded the voices, perspectives, and counter-traditions of cultural minorities, leaving
them at the mercy of past practices, and embedded habits of majoritarian forces." Id.
15
See PELIKAN, supra note 10, at 53-54.
16

See REFLECTIONS, supranote 4, at 33-34.

17

See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INERPRETATION 23 (1997) [hereinafter A MATTER OF

INTERPRETATION].

See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 650 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating, with regard
to the due process clauses in particular, "[iut is precisely the historical practices that define what is 'due."').
18

19

Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 96 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Professors

Pritchard and Zywicki describe Justice Scalia's view of tradition as the Majoritarian Theory. See A.C.
Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition's Role in
Constitutional Interpretation. 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 412 (1999). See also Autumn Fox & Stephen R.
McAllister, An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudenceof Justice Antonin Scalia, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 223, 308
(1997) (explaining that "[w]hen Scalia says that it would be a violation of his oath to adhere to decisions
which intrude upon the democratic process, that statement is consistent with his belief that judges should be

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol103/iss1/5

4

Broughton: The Jurisprudence of Tradition and Justice Scalia's Unwritten Con

20001

SCALIA 'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION

provides the discipline necessary among those charged with determining its
meaning.
But the use of tradition as an interpretative tool, though appealing
particularly to Burkeans, is not as an interpretive tool immune from critical inquiry.
Others, scholars and judges alike, have cited problems with Justice Scalia's
method:2" how is "tradition" to be defined, and at what level of generality must
judges identify it to properly embrace its constitutional significance? Are all
traditions equal in Justice Scalia's mind, and if so, what must judges do when
traditions conflict? Moreover, does the Constitution account for and validate
traditions that are obnoxious to principles of justice, freedom, and tolerable order?
These are important concerns, deserving of the consideration they have received in
the legal academy and the courts. But other questions arise from Justice Scalia's
traditionalism as well, questions that. come not from the anti-Burkeans but from the
Burkeans themselves. 21 Namely, can a Constitution that values tradition still adapt
to a changing, pluralist society? If Scalia is truly a textualist,22 to what value does
he ascribe unwritten traditions even when the text is facially unambiguous? Finally,
restrained."); James Edward Wyszynski Jr., In Praise of Judicial Restraint. The Jurisprudence of Justice
Antonin Scalia, 1 DET. C.L. REv. 117, 120 (1989) (explaining that Justice Scalia's jurisprudence is consistent
with his view of restrained judging).
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 97-109
20
(1991). See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 60 (1980) (describing the problem of
identifying traditions); Pritchard & Zywicki, supra note 19, at 413 (agreeing that Justice Scalia's view is
"excessively majoritarian" and insufficiently protective of minority rights).
21
See Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 623 (1994). Professor Young's piece deftly analyzes Burke's
philosophy and writings and concludes that Justice Scalia (along with Judge Robert Bork) does not satisfy
Burkean conservative criteria. Id. Professor Young's scholarship is graceful and persuasive, and is a
substantial contribution to the literature on this jurisprudential subject The instant humble article does not
quarrel with Professor Young's conclusions about Burkean political theory, or his conclusion that some of
Justice Scalia's writing raises questions about his conformity to Burke; it departs only from the conclusion
that Justice Scalia does not ultimately fit the Burkean mold. As this article attempts to explain, although it is
true that some of Justice Scalia's superficially libertarian decisions (for example, his First Amendment
decisions) and his writings that appear somewhat hostile to social change, indicate departures from the
prudence of Burke, his overall jurisprudential method is nonetheless faithful to Burkean notions of
prescriptive rights and duties, to the validation of accumulated practices and lessons. See also DAVID G.
SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST COURT 55 (John Wiky & Sons, Inc. 1992)
(1993) (describing Justice Scalia's conservative credentials); Chow, supra note 10, at 809 (placing Justice
Scalia in the Burkean mold); Luban, supra note 11,at 1039 (arguing that Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), demonstrated "the voice of conservative traditionalism protesting
contemporary Enlightenment's penchant for moral revision"). The point being that although Justice Scalia
could sometimes be a better Burkean, this is not to deny the powerful existence of certain Burkean attributes
in his jurisprudence.
Cf Stephen E. Gottlieb, Three Justices in Search of a Character:The Moral Agendas of Justices
O'Connor,Scalia, and Kennedy, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 222 (1996) (explaining that Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy "are essential to the conservative majority of the Court"); David A. Strauss, Tradition,
Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699, 1700 (1991) (noting the Burkean criticism of
Justice Scalia regarding his "attitude toward precedent". Ultimately, Professor Strauss concludes that "[t]he
problem with Justice Scalia is that he is too much of a Burkean, not the opposite." Id at 1701.
See A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 23. See also Richard B. Saphire,
Constitutional Predispositions,23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 278, 285-291 (1998) (examining Justice Scalia's
textualism in light of his originalism, and vice versa).
22
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if tradition plays such an important role in defining our constitutional life, what
significance must we ascribe to judicial traditions (precedent-making)?2 3
This article thus examines Justice Scalia's jurisprudence of tradition and
the questions, some just noted, that it raises for constitutional adjudication. Part II
provides a brief review of tradition's pedigree in law. It traces the practices of
significant ancient and early modem cultures, as well as American constitutionalist
views of tradition's role in governing the republic, demonstrating that Justice
Scalia's perspective generally has a notable and principled intellectual, political,

and social foundation. Part III then examines Justice Scalia's opinions in various
areas of constitutional law that highlight his traditionalism. Although it is beyond
the scope of this article to cover Justice Scalia's writing in every case in every
relevant constitutional category, the cases included herein demonstrate adequately
the high regard he has for tradition in interpreting the Constitution. Part IV then
provides a critical analysis of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence from the prudentialist's
perspective, concluding that Justice Scalia's methodology exists in harmony with
an unwritten Constitution of tradition, an unwritten Constitution that, however,
differs greatly from that to which modem jurisprudence conventionally refers.24
Justice Scalia's unwritten Constitution is prescriptive, conscious of and not hostile
to rights, but nonetheless recognizes the intrinsic value of social order as
effectuated through republican political institutions, thus opposing the unwritten
Constitution of abstraction - the more aptly named "Living Constitution" - that
places the highest value on the human dignity of rights and free choices.25
II.

THE PEDIGREE OF TRADITION IN LAW: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

While the American constitutional regime remains unique, it was not cut
23

See Strauss, supra note 21, at 1701 (explaining the Burkean criticism that Justice Scalia is "too

cavalier toward the views of past Justices who have thought carefully about the problems"); David Boling,
The JurisprudentialApproach of Justice Antonin Scalia: Methodology Over Result?, 44 APK. L. REv. 1143,
1198 (1991) (questioning Justice Scalia's respect for precedent).
24

See Antonin Scalia, Is There an Unwritten Constitution, 12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1989)

[herinafter Unwritten Constitution]. In this brief introductory piece, Justice Scalia notes the controversy over
the "unwritten constitution." He points out that, on the one hand, there is no unwritten constitution because,
quite obviously, we are governed by a written instrument. Id. On the other hand, "[m]any, if not most, of the
provisions of the Constitution do not make sense except as they are given meaning by the historical
background in which they were adopted." Id. Justice Scalia's piece thus foreshadows the conclusion in this
article, that Scalia's traditionalism produces an unwritten constitution, though Justice Scalia's other writing
does not explicitly endorse an unwritten constitution.
25
For an excellent discussion of the tension between the types of unwritten constitutions, see
generally RIGHTS AND DUTIES, supra note 5. Of particular importance is Professor Hittinger's introduction,
which counters the "facilitative" unwritten constitution of Justice Brennan with Dr. Kirk's, which "vested in
concrete society, is the source of genuine though unwritten norms reconciling liberty and authority." Russell
Hittinger, Introduction to RUSSELL RIGHTS AND DUTIES xxv-xxvi (1997) [herinafter Introduction]. See also
Thomas Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 710 (1975) (explaining the
natural rights origins of the Constitution and noting that the pure interpretive model "cannot be reconciled
with constitutional doctrines protecting unspecified 'essential' or 'fundamental' liberties, or 'fair' procedure,
or decency.').
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from whole cloth. Rather, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights are organic
documents that embody centuries of legal and political thought, practice, and
experience; in a word, intellectual and social tradition.As this section explains, the
traditions of the American people (both generally, and in the various American
jurisdictions) and of American law writ large are much the product of the English
experience. It also is important to note in particular the practices of the ancients, as
the literate American founding generation relied heavily upon the lessons of the
ancients in crafting our fundamental law. Of those various practices and orders,
American law has rejected some, while others it has altered for the sake of adapting
to America's singular social and political culture. So as we evaluate Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence on this subject, it is useful to bear in mind tradition's historical
pedigree in law, for it is this pedigree that informs what has become Justice Scalia's
unwritten constitution.
A.

TraditionFrom Athens to London to Burke

As Professor Kirk explains, the constitutional order of America grew from
the legacy left by the political orders of the great western and Judeo-Christian
cultures.26 In some, the law developed through divine inspiration, such as the
Hebrew tradition, in which Moses revealed the law to the wandering children of
Israel through Yahweh's commandments. 27 That legacy has informed our nation's
moral order, which in turn, has directly influenced its legal order.28 In other
civilizations, however, the laws by which the people were governed arose not from
divinity directly but through custom, convention, and precept inspired by real
experience.
The early Greeks provided an excellent example. The formations of Greek
law appear in Homeric epic poetry. 29 There arose the notions of themis, a sort of
divinely-inspirel law representing the judgments of the gods, and dike, which for
Homer appeared to represent an earthly imitation of the heavenly law but which
later came to represent justice, in its abstract sense. 30 Later, Greek law began to
develop on the concept of nomos, or custom, which later would evolve also into
statutory law.31 Although the sophists, using the concept of law as based on mere
convention, posited that all law was thus relative and variable (because customs
differ from place to place),32 Socrates responded by attaching greater moral weight

26

RooTs OF AMERICAN ORDER, supra note 3, at 6.

27

at 11-12.
See id.

28

See id.

29

KELLY, supra note 2,at 6.

30

Id. at 7. See generally HOMER, THE ILIAD (Richmond Lattimore, trans., Univ. of Chicago Press

1951).
31

KELLY, supra note 2,.at 7.

32

Id at14.
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to convention.33 Indeed, Socrates in the Crito identifies custom and convention
with the implicit obligations of a citizen to the state. 34 Still later, Aristotle in his
Politics explained that man's tendency to associate with others in civil life grew out
of organic experiences, thus demonstrating the connection between accumulated
customs and the formation of legal and political order.35 Aristotle, whose
philosophy of law grew out of a field of vision that included (but was not limited
to) the observation of empirical phenomenon, also identifies the relationship of law
to custom and convention in his Ethics.36 There he explains the importance of
phronesis, or prudence, to the state's legal order. More than cautiousness, which is
an element but not the sum of prudence, phronesis embodies a practical wisdom
gained through one's experience, observation, and habit. It is phronesis, then, that
involves the practical application of concepts, avoids abstract theorizing, and thus
serves as a guide to law making and law judging.37 Thus, although the connection is
not as firm as would be apparent in English jurisprudence, we can nonetheless see
that the ancient Greeks provided a foundation for examining the modem notion of
accumulated habitual experiences as a developmental characteristic of positive
laws.
So, too, with the Romans. The early Roman republic knew the ius civile, or
civil law, which "was a complex body of customary laws, not ordinarily
promulgated through formal enactment by Senate and People, but rather developing
out of long usage among the Romans themselves. 38 As Roman power increased
and the sphere of its authority extended beyond its limits, the Romans came to
know the ius gentium, the law of nations, which was a second body of law
"founded upon customs more or less common to non-Roman peoples."3 9 Like
Aristotle before them, however, the Romans were concerned that the tension
between the ius civile and the ius gentium, as well as the statutory law generally,
might produce injustice. 40 Led in significant part by Cicero, then, the Romans
developed the ius naturalis,the natural law, which, guided by rational principles of
ethics and justice, would serve to complement, inform, and effectuate the custombased norms that the other bodies of law prescribed in writing. 4' Thus, for Cicero,
3:3

Id. at 15-16.

See PLATO, FIVE DIALOGUES 53-56 (G.M.A. Grube, trans., Hackett Publishing, 1981)(Dialogue
between Socrates and Crito).

34

35

See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 36-37 (Cames Lord, trans., Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984).

36

See ARISTOTLE, ETHICS 213-14 (J.A.K. Thomson, trans., Penguin Books, 1953).

37

Id. at 209-210.

ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER, supranote 3, at 108. Kirk notes that development of the ius civile
was similar to that of the common law in England, described infra text and accompanying notes. Id.
38

39

Id. at 109.

40

Id. See also ARISTOTLE, supra note 36, at 198-99 (describing Aristotle's view that the law must

provide a corrective when injustice results from the application of legislation to particular circumstances).
41

See REPUBLIC, supra note 1, at 68-69. Cicero (though the character of Gaius Laelius) explains
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the natural law, unwritten and a product of right reason, is superior to the civil law,
law of nations, and statutory laws, but does not oppose them. 42 Rather, it "enables
law humanely. .
us, through reason, to apply customary and statutory
' 43

.

. an

instrument of progress, not a weapon for revolution.
The most directly influential experience on the American constitutional
scheme, however, was that of the English.44 Though they, too, built upon the
foundations of the Greek and Roman experience, the English developed a
comprehensive body of law based on custom, the common law,45 and on the ethical
norms that must guide a just political regime when an otherwise just law proves
unjust in particular application, equity.46 The common law of England, unlike its
predecessors in some ancient civilizations, developed as unwritten, though it later
would be written in the form of court judgments rather than by codification in
statute books. 47 Blackstone described the English common law system as one "built
upon the soundest foundations, and approved by the experience of ages,"48 and his
Commentaries on the Laws of England provided a powerful defense of the virtue
and wisdom of past institutions and customs.4 9 It was thus organic, borne of
law in the proper sense is right reason in harmony with nature. It is spread through the
whole community, unchanging and eternal, calling people to their duty by its commands
and deterring them from wrong-doing by its prohibitions. When it addresses a good
man, its commands and prohibitions are never in vain; but those same commands and
prohibitions have no effect on the wicked. This law cannot be countermanded, nor can
it be in any way amended, nor can it be totally rescinded.... Whoever refuses to obey it
will be turning his back on himself.

Id.
See also CICERO, THE LAWS 124 (Niall Rudd, trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 1998) (52-51 B.C.)
(hereafter LAWS) (recapitulating the natural law, which originates from divinity, which is "rightly praised, for
it represents the reason and intelligence of a wise man directed to issuing commands and prohibitions);
ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER, supranote 3, at 109-10 (describing generally natural law).
42
See REPUBLIC, supra note 1, at 68-69. See also ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER, supra note 3, at
111-112 (explaining that Cicero, "so strongly attached to tradition and precedent, a man of constitutionality
and order, was not arguing that we ought to challenge every customary or statutory law on the degree of its
conformity to natural law.").
43
Id. at 112
44

See id. at 183-84.

4S

See generallyJOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OFTHE ENGLISH COMMON LAW (1996) (describing
the customs and principles that led to the development of the English common law). As Professor Hudson
explains, "[c]ustoms are not simply neutral statements of what usually happens; rather, they are prescriptions
ofestablished and proper action, prescriptions which carry authority." Id. at 6.
46
See id. at 187.
Id. at 184.
48

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *5.

See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 72-74 (1941). Boorstin's
classic work posits that Blackstone recognized two types of appeal to the past, both of which informed the
growth and improvement of the common law: primitivism and traditionalism, the latter tempering the former.
Id. In the context of this existing structure of past institutions, then, Blackstone thus believed that traditions
were deserving of respect, Id at 73. "Indeed," Boorstin writes, "all the virtues of tradition seemed inherent
in the very definition of the English common law because, after all, the common law was rooted in custom."
Id. (emphasis added).
49
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national customs and precedents, of the doctrine of stare decisis (let the precedent

stand). 50 The common law therefore was not the singular creation of judges or
kings but a source of their power. 5' In this sense, it also protected the interests of
the people it governed: the common law recognized a right to be free from selfincrimination and from unreasonable searches; the writ system gave English people
access to justice; the jury system ensured that sanctions could not be imposed upon
a citizen without the concurrence of fellow citizens, thus protecting them from
arbitrary or capricious state action. 52 Indeed, in Blackstone's Commentaries "rights
always held the center of the stage," 53 most especially those of security, liberty, and
property. 54 Thus as Professor Kirk explains, "[t]he common law is empirical law:
that is, based upon men's experience over many generations, a good test of
practicality." 55
The English practice of equity also reflected the nation's reverence for
tradition. While Cicero's ius naturalis informed the development of the common
law, it also guided the English courts' equitable jurisdiction, providing a moral and
philosophical basis for establishing justice.56 Equity thus "chastened and corrected"
the common law, both of which ultimately were used to improve the English civil
social order by recognizing the tension between order and freedom that the English
experience had demonstrated. 7 Indeed, many of the civil liberties that the common
law guarded found their way, deliberately, into the American Bill of Rights, linking
inextricably the English understanding of ordered freedom with American
See also 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5 (explaining that "it has been the peculiar lot of our
admirable system of laws, to be neglected, and even unknown, by all but one practical profession; though
built upon the soundest foundations, and approved by the experience of ages"); 3 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *268 (explaining, with regard to remedial laws, that the English have inherited "an old
Gothic castle, erected in the days of chivalry, but fitted up for a modem inhabitant") ; id. at *436 (explaining
that courts of law and equity in "matters of positive right" must "submit to and follow those ancient and
invariable maxims, 'quae relictafunt et tradita."')
50

See HUDSON, supra note 45, at 21.

See ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER, supra note 3, at 184. Professor Hudson also described the
protections for individual rights in the common law, as well as in Magna Carta, itself an embodiment of
English custom. See HUDSON, supra note 45, at 226 ("Typically, Magna Carta established law on the stated
grounds of recording good custom").
52
See ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER, supra note 3, at 186-87.
51

BOORSTIN, supra note 49, at 162. Boorstin further explains that "[i]n
every discussion, rights
were considered primary, while duties were treated as secondary or merely negative .... [t]he
whole structure
of the Commentaries was built around the concept of rights." Id.
53

See I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125-36. Blackstone regarded life, liberty, and property as
the absolute rights. He stated that the right to natural life cannot be "disposed of or destroyed by any
individual" on his or her own authority. Id.at 129. He also explained that "next to personal security, the law
of England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of individuals." Id.at 130. Finally, Blackstone
noted that the right of property was "inherent in every Englishman.... The laws of England are therefore, in
point of honor and justice, extremely watchful in ascertaining and protecting this right." Id. at 134.
54

55

ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER, supra note 3, at 188.

56

See REPUBLIC, supra note 1,at 68-69.

57

ROOTS OF AMERICAN

ORDER,

supra note 3, at 191.
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constitutionalism.5 8
Likewise, the prominence of tradition in English law found expression in a
number of figures who proved important not only to the English themselves but to
generations of American lawyers and lawgivers. Hume, whose History of England
gained notoriety in America, demonstrated through his Treatise on Human Nature
and An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals the fallacy of abstraction in
political life; 59 his refutation of Lockean social contract theory thus appealed to the
practical politics of the American Framers.60 Blackstone's Commentaries, which
practically codified the common law, were read and cited widely in the American
founding generation; 6 he is cited by both Publius 6 2 and Brutus. 63 Moreover, the
writings of judges Coke and Hale informed significantly the American ideas of
jurisprudence.64 But it was Burke who proved to be the chief intellectual and
58

See id. at 187.

See David Hume, A Treastise of Human Nature, in DAVID HUME, POLITICAL WRITINGS 47-51
(Stuart D. Warner & Donald W. Livingston, eds., Hackett Publishing, 1994) (1739); DAVID HUME, AN
INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 23 (Charles W. Hendel, ed., Prentice Hall Publishing
1957) (1751) (arguing that "[h]istory, experience, reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of
human sentiments and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice").
See Thomas S. Engeman, The Federalist, in THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 80 (Peter Augustine
Lawler & Robert Martin Shaefer, eds., 1994). Professor Engeman admits that the Framers were influenced
by the English (though not the French) Enlightenment and by Locke's conclusion that "man's passionate
nature could not be changed." Id He further argues, however, that
Publius seems to have been influenced by the even more traditional liberalism of David
Hume and other thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, and by Baron de Montesquieu.
Unlike John Locke, who argued that men could make governments anew based on
consent and natural rights - life, liberty, and the pursuit of property (or happiness in the
Declaration of Independence), David Hume argued that rights and liberties could safely
(or really) develop only in practice, through political experience. In Hume's view, the
historical practice of political societies determines their politics, not a theoretical
formulation of the political good.
Id.
Cf JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 278 (Peter Laslett, ed., Cambridge University
Press 1988) (1690) (arguing that man exists in a state of nature until he consents to enter into civil society,
whereby he forms a social compact with the state). This article adheres to the position that the Constitution's
Framers, while well-versed in Enlightenment political thought, did not incorporate much Enlightenment
theory into the original Constitution; rather, they took such figures as Cicero, Hume, and Montesquieu as
their guides. See Engeman, supra this note, at 80. There is substantial academic disagreement, however,
concerning the influence of the Enlightenment thinkers, particularly Locke, on the Framers. For more on the
arguments about Locke and Enlightenment political thought in the early American republic, compare RIGHTS
AND DUTIES, supra note 5, at 95-109 (rejecting the view that Locke primarily influenced the constitutional
order) with Michael S. Moore, The Dead Handof ConstitutionalTradition, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 263,
268 (1995) (arguing that among the responses to Burkean constitutional theory is the fact that "our tradition
in America is much more Lockean than it is Burkean").
61
See generally BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.

60

62

See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 418-419 (Alexander Hamilton); No. 84, at 512 (Alexander

Hamilton) (referring to Blackstone as "judicious").
63

See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, JAN. 31, 1788, at 295 (Ralph Ketcham, ed. 1986); FEB. 14,

1788, at 303.
See ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER, supra note 3, at 191; EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES; MATTHEW
HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND.
64
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political expositor of custom, convention, and continuity, as well as of natural law,
in England, and his influence is still felt in American constitutional law65 (today, in
the jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, in particular). As Professor Kronman explains,
"[I]f a person were inclined ...to swim against the current by taking the claims of
traditionalism seriously, both in the law and outside it.

..

one place to begin ...is

the work of Edmund Burke.... [N]o one since Burke has defended the claims of
traditionalism with more vigor and intelligence."
Burke, a contemporary of the Framers and an ardent defender of English
custom-centered common law and constitution, urged a "custodial attitude" toward
the past, creating duties among generations to preserve right customs and practices,
for it is the lamp of experience that will guide social improvement.67 In his
Reflections on the Revolution in France,Burke explains that,
[a] spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper
and confined views. People will not look forward to posterity,
who never look backward to their ancestors. Besides, the people
of England well know, that the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure
principle of conservation, and a sure principle of transmission;
without at all excluding a principle of improvement.68
Thus for Burke, the principle of prescription - the unwritten principle that binds
immemorial usage to legal norms - guided Burke's views on politics and law,
including his opposition to abstraction and zealotry, unlinked to experience and
context, against which he so eloquently enveighed in the Reflections.69 Burke, ever
cognizant of the dangers inherent in rapidly undoing old orders, continued,
[o]ne of the first and most leading principles on which the
commonwealth and the laws are consecrated, is lest the temporary
possessors and life-renters in it, unmindful of what they have
received from their ancestors, or of what is due to their posterity,
should act as if they were the entire masters; that they should not
think it amongst their rights to cut off the entail, or commit waste
on the inheritance, by destroying at their pleasure the whole
original fabric of their society; hazarding to leave to those who
come after them, a ruin instead of an habitation - and teaching
these succesors as little to respect their contrivances, as they had
themselves respected the institutions of their forefathers. By this
supra note 3, at 383.

65

See ROOTS OF AMERICAN

66

See Kronman, supra note 11, at 1047.
See REFLECTIONS, supranote 4, at 33. The comparisons to Blackstone are inevitable and Boorstin

67

ORDER,

does it well and often: "Blackstone, like Burke after him, was saying that institutions, from the mere fact that
they had long existed, had some claim to reverence and to preservation." BOORSTIN, supranote 49, at 73.
68

REFLECTIONS, supranote 4, at 33.

69

See Canavan, supranote 4, at 44.
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unprincipled facility of changing the state as often, and as much,
and in as many ways as there are floating fancies and fashions, the
whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth would be
broken. No one generation could link with the other. Men would
become little better than the flies of a summer. 0
None of this is to suggest that Burke opposed change; quite the contrary.
For Burke, change in the state and in the laws is necessary to the preservation of
both.71 Human societies, ever mortal, decay over time and demand renewal, lest
they go the way of the summer's flies. 72 But a prudent system of law resists speedy
and unthinking changes, for such alterations threaten the stability and continuity of
institutions that, at their best, rely upon experience to establish a healthy tension
between freedom and authority. 3 Change, for Burke and other defenders of
tradition, must "always occur within a framework that emphasizes the value of
existing institutions." 74
Thus, a tradition of tradition, so to speak, has developed in law from the
great civilizations of the west, from the human laws, directly effectuating social and
political customs, to the natural law, preserving moral traditions embodied in the
ethical norms of people and their communities. As we shall see, particularly with
regard to the English tradition, America's Constitution, and those who have framed
and described it, owes much to this legacy.
B.

Tradition in American ConstitutionalHistory

Just as tradition as an instrument of law was not new to America's English
predecessors, neither was it new to Americans. Professor Kirk explains, for
example, Burke's influence on the American Constitution. 75 First, consistent with
Burke, the Constitution "did not break with established institutions and customs of
the American people."7 6 Second, it effectuated the historical experience of
England? 7 Third, it abhors a priori government. 78 As Sir William Holdsworth
70

REFLECTIONS, supra note 4, at 95.

71

See id. at 34.

72

See id. at 95.

73

See POLITICS OF PRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 24-25. Kirk explains that

[c]hange is essential to the body social ... just as it is essential to the human body. A
body that has ceased to renew itself has begun to die. But if that body is to be vigorous,

the change must occur in a regular manner, harmonizing with the form and nature of that
body; otherwise, change produces a monstrous growth, a cancer, which devours its host.

Id.
74

Chow, supra note 10, at 787.

75

See RIGHTS AND DUTIES, supra note 5, at 119-125.

76

Id. at 119.

77

See id.
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recognized with Burke that such theories, however

well they might be suited to a period of revolution, were of very little help in a
period of reconstruction. They therefore abandoned the democratic theories of
Paine and Rousseau, and went for inspiration to that eighteenth century British
constitution with which they were familiar. 7 9 Finally, like its English counterpart
that Burke so often defended, it restrains power, avoids centralization, and
expressly endorses Burke's view that the members of the national legislature be
representatives of judgment, not delegates sent to serve as a mere mouthpiece for
public opinion. 80 In addition, Burke's traditionalism ultimately took hold in
America's intellectual legal climate, notably in Justice Story's Commentaries on
the Constitution and Chancellor Kent's Commentaries on American Law.81 True,
Burke's influence upon the American Constitution is limited. The Framers did not
endorse his theory of cabinet government, nor did they initially approve of political
parties, 82 which Burke defended in his Thoughts on the Cause of the Present
Discontents.3 Nonetheless, Burke specifically, and the previously described
English experience generally, had much to do with the development, and success,
of American constitutionalism, written and unwritten."
In like manner, the Supreme Court has routinely referred to social and
political traditions and customs when explaining the meaning of the constitutional
text. As this article explains, the commitment to tradition as informing
constitutional values and norms has reached a new height during the Rehnquist
Court era.85 Nonetheless, the pre-Rehnquist Court case law bears out a certain
methodology of traditionalism in a number of areas of constitutional law. In the

78

See id.at 120.

79

9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 137 (1938).
See RIGHTS AND DUTIES, supra note 5,at 120. See also Edmund Burke, Letter to the Sheriffs of

80

Bristol, in EDMUND BURKE: SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 187 (Peter J. Stanlis, ed., Regnery
Publishing, 1963) (1777) (offering a classic expression of the doctrine of representation as opposed to
delegation). Burke explained in his-acceptance speech upon election to Parliament:
[Your representative's] unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened
conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living.
These he does not derive from your pleasure - no, nor from the law and the
Constitution.... Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment;
and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
Id.at 224. To see how Burke's representation doctrine influenced the American Constitution, see generally
THE FEDERALIST NoS. 10, 51 (James Madison).
81
See RIGHTS AND DUTIES, supra note 5, at 124 (explaining that these works were "of Burke's mode
of thought").
82
See id.at 120-121.
8

See Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, in EDMUND BURKE,
SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 121 (Peter J.Stanlis, ed., Regnery Publishing, 1963) (1770).
84
See RIGHTS AND DUTIES, supra note 5,at 123.
85

See infra Sections III and IV.A. text and accompanying notes.
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area of equal protection, for example, the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson6 stated "[the
state] is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and
traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the
preservation of the public peace and good order.'" 7
Of course, Plessy's example points to one common problem with a
tradition-bound approach, that tradition may often be used to justify what many
others (clearly not, however, the Plessy majority or the Louisiana Legislature of the
late nineteenth century) view as an intolerable order, thus raising the question of
whether such customs ought to have constitutional validity in a regime of rights.
But the Court's reliance on tradition has not always produced such problematic
results. In the area of justiciablity, for example, Justice Frankfurter in Joint AntiFascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath8" attempted to ground the standing
requirement in the English common law tradition. 89 And in the area of religious

liberty, the Court in Zorach v. Clauson9" recognized the vitality of America's
religious traditions, stating "[w]hen the state encourages religious instruction or
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the
religious nature of our people... .,91

The cases explicating the meaning of "due process" and the early
incorporation controversy provide even more powerful examples. Before adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Curtis (known also for his powerful dissent
in Dred Scott v. Sanford),92 in Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Company,93 described the scope of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
by relying upon the English experience. He explained that due process of law was
"undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words 'by the law of the
land' in Magna Carta."' Justice Curtis further explained, "[we] must look to those
settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of
England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have
been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on them
8

163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).

87

See id

8

341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951)(Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).

89

See id ("[federal courts must] not decide a question unless the nature of the action challenged, the

kind of injury inflicted, and the relationship between the parties are such that judicial determination is

consonant with what was ... the business of the Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the
Constitution was framed." For an excellent discussion of constitutional standing and its relationship to
English practice, see Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs: The Original
Understanding,63 BROOK. L. REv. 1001 (1997).
90
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
91

Id. at 314-15.

92

See 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (Curtis, J.,
dissenting).

93

59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).

94

See id. at 276.
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after the settlement of this country. 95 The Court continued to rely upon English
custom and precedent after the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was
adopted. This reliance was evident in Twining v. New Jersey.96 There, although the
Court stated that the meaning of the personal rights secured by the Bill of Rights
was to be determined ultimately by the nature of such rights in relation to our
concept of due process of law, it also conceded that the Court was "accustomed" to
looking at such "great instruments" as the Magna Carta and the Petition of Right to
determine which rights are fundamental in our constitutional scheme.97
But perhaps the Court's most explicit early reliance upon tradition in the
area of due process rights came in the view first expressed by Justice Cardozo in
Snyder v. Massachusetts,98 which rejected a criminal defendant's claim that due
process entitled him to visit the scene of the crime with the jury, then in Palko v.
Connecticut,99 which rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a state statute
permitting the state to appeal in criminal cases. 1°° Going beyond mere reliance
upon English legal tradition, Justice Cardozo's view sought meaning in the Due
Process Clause by looking to "a principle of justice so rooted in the tradition and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."10 1 The Cardozo view,
which recognized the Constitution's reconciliation of order and liberty, long served
as the prevalent view in determining the existence of constitutional rights against
the states. 02 Indeed, Justice Frankfurter in Rochin v. California0 3 referred to
Justice Cardozo's formulation as the "settled conception of the Due Process
Clause,"' ' 0 5and recognized that "due process of law [is] 'itself a historical
product.,"1
The modem notion of using tradition to inform the meaning of the law, and
more particularly the Constitution, reached its highest expression in the midTwentieth Century in the jurisprudence of the second Justice Harlan. Justice
Harlan, however, offered a more refined use of tradition than the earlier cases
demonstrate, grounding his methodology not only in the historical practices in the
body politic but also in the case law itself, which represents the traditions of the
95

Id. at 277.

96

211 U.S. 78 (1908).

97

Id.at 107.

98

291 U.S. 97 (1934).

99

302 U.S. 319 (1937).

l00

See id.

101

Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105.

102

See Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (stating that the Constitution protects those rights that are "of the very

essence of a scheme of ordered liberty").
103
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
104

Id. at 169.

105

Id.at 168 (quoting Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922)).
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judiciary. Justice Harlan, eminently Burkean in temper and method, thus embraced
a common law constitutionalism that marked his prudentially pragmatic
1 ° judicial
character, of which his reverence for tradition was an essential element. 6
Justice Harlan demonstrated that using tradition - either that of society (in
the form of customs and practices) or of the Court (in the form of judicial
precedents) - in constitutional adjudication has a way of reinforcing the value that
the constitutional design places on legitimate governmental authority and the role
of the republican political process. 0 7 Thus, in Mapp v. Ohio,'0 8 which applied the
exclusionary rule to state criminal prosecutions, Justice Harlan's dissent chided the
majority for its departure from stare decisis and thus from established judicial
norms.' 0 9 His dissent in Miranda v. Arizona110 echoed the same theme. There,
dissenting from the Court's decision requiring law enforcement officials to inform
criminal defendants of their constitutional rights upon custodial interrogation,
Justice Harlan explained that the Court's "utopian" effort to purge the criminal
justice system of pressure on criminal suspects "requires a strained reading of
history and precedent and a disregard of the very pragmatic concerns that alone
may on occasion justify such strains.""' Moreover, Justice Harlan noted that the
legislatures provided the better forum for criminal justice reform and that the Court
would do well to observe the strides that states had been making in this area." 2
Justice Harlan's prudential deference to republican institutions was not
limited to criminal law and procedure either, as his dissenting opinions in the
legislative reapportionment cases demonstrate. In Baker v. Carr,'1 3 the Court held
that challenges to a state's reapportionment scheme on equal protection grounds
were justiciable in federal courts. 1 4 Justice Harlan crafted a vigorous dissent that
validated societal traditions and, at the same time, rejected the premise that federal
court involvement was warranted." 5 The reapportionment battles, he explained,
were "internal political conflicts," the wisdom or desirability of a particular
resolution of which was not the business of the courts to judge." 6 Rather, so long as
106

See generally J.Richard Broughton, Unforgettable, Too: The (Juris)PrudentialLegacy of the

Second Justice Harlan, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 57, 68 (1999) (comparing the second Justice Harlan to
Burke and placing the Justice in the prudential pragmatist school of contemporary jurisprudence).
107
See id at 81-82.
108

367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Harlan,J.,
dissenting).

1o9

See id. at672 (Harlan,J.,
dissenting).

110

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

ill

Id.at 505 (Harlan,J.,
dissenting).

112

See id.
at 524 (Harlan,J.,
dissenting).

113

369 U.S. 186 (1962).

114

See id.

115

See id.
at332 (Harlan,J.,
dissenting).

116

See id.
at333 (Harlan,J.,
dissenting).
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a state proceeded rationally, it was entitled to select'1 17legislative structures that best
fit "the interests, temper, and customs of its people."
The same deference to societal customs appeared in Justice Harlan's
dissent in Wesberry v. Sanders,1 8 which invalidated a Georgia reapportionment
statute, and a congressional district that it produced, based on the "one man, one
vote" principle." 9 Concerned seriously that the Court's intrusion into these matters
did great damage to its legitimacy, Justice Harlan argued that the proper venue for
political reforms was the political process itself, which was a process that was20
weakened every time the courts intervened in such essentially political matters.'
Thus, what we see from the aforementioned opinions is not merely a backwardlooking devotion to simple majoritarianism. Rather, these opinions reflect Justice
Harlan's view that traditions both give meaning to the constitutional text and
simultaneously restrain judges, thus legitimating both the republican process and
the judicial process. Efforts to effectuate an "Earthly Paradise" through judicial
will, in Justice Harlan's view, were destined to produce
a "Terrestrial Hell" that
121
would ruin our vital political and judicial institutions.
Justice Harlan also demonstrated, however, that tradition need not always
be an instrument for upholding governmental power. Rather, tradition, properly
understood, may often validate certain important personal rights, as the English
common law experience indicated. 22 Justice Harlan's most profound expression of
this view appeared in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman,123 which held that a challenge to
Connecticut's anti-contraception law was not justiciable where petitioners were
not,. and had not been threatened to be, prosecuted under the statute. 124 He
proceeded from his assertion that the Constitution sought to balance the claims of
liberty and authority, both of which embody tradition. 125 Indeed, balancing those
claims requires reference to traditions from which the nation developed, as well as
"the traditions from which it broke."'126 Concluding that here the prohibition on
contraceptive use violated the petitioners' liberty pursuant to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he explained that "tradition is a living thing.
A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive,

117

Id. at 334 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

118

376 U.S. 1 (1964).

119

See id. at 20.

120

See id. at 48 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

121

See id.

122

See generally supra note 3, at 190.

123

367 U.S. 497 (1961).

124

See id.at537.

125

See id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

126

Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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127
while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound."
Under these circumstances, Justice Harlan recognized that a tradition had
evolved which gave protection to marital privacy, and he found no countervailing
and superseding tradition on the part of the state that would justify violating such
privacy. 128 True toh
to his prudential instincts, however, Justice Harlan was careful to
circumscribe his view to prevent unprincipled judicial invalidation of legislation
that, unlike the Connecticut contraception prohibition, was grounded in a tolerable
tradition of proscription.1 29 He echoed this innovative yet restrained view of
tradition in Griswold v. Connecticut,'30 which, only four years later, invalidated the
same law after both a Connecticut physician and the executive director of Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut were prosecuted thereunder.131
Moreover, Justice Harlan's view influenced subsequent substantive due
process cases, most notably in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,3 2 which held
unconstitutional a city ordinance limiting occupancy of any dwelling unit to
members of the same narrowly-defined "family."' 33 Citing Justice Harlan's
Griswold concurrence, and the need to reconcile judicial restraint with recognition
of important rights, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court noted that precedents
"establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because
the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition..
[Ours] is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the nuclear family."' '
The same view, though cited extensively, produced a much different result
in Bowers v. Hardwick,135 which held that no tradition existed to validate the claim
that "liberty" includes the right to engage in homosexual sodomy.'3 In Bowers,
Justice White asserted that because they had "ancient roots," laws criminalizing
homosexual sodomy were not prohibited under either Justice Cardozo's Pa'lko
formulation or the formulation that Justice Harlan espoused to justify the right
recognized in Moore.3 7
127

Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a conservative criticism of Justice Harlan's Poe dissent and

the use of tradition in law generally, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 231-35 (1990).
Judge Bork argues that, despite the appeal to tradition, "[Justice] Harlan's arguments were entirely legislative.
... [Justice] Harlan's methodology, often admired by advocates of judicial restraint, turns out to offer no
protection against judicial imperialism." Id. at 234-35.
128
Poe, 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129

Id. at 552-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

130

381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).

131

See id.

132

431 U.S. 494 (1977).

133

See id.

134

Id.at 503-04.

135

478 U.S. 186 (1986).

136

See id

137

Id. at 191-92.
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Thus, tradition has played an important role not merely in the development
of law generally, but particularly in the development of American constitutional
law. As an interpretive device, it has served as an instrument for preserving
majoritarian prerogatives and for restraining judges." 8 Tradition also, however, has
played a dominant role in explaining the existence of individual rights within the
meaning of the constitutional text. 13 9 As will be seen, however, the Rehnquist
Court, and the jurisprudence of Justice Scalia in particular, has produced an
enhanced era of traditionalism in constitutional interpretation that has reiterated the
advantages of tradition as an element of law, but that also raises growing concerns
about its application in a pluralistic constitutional culture.

III. JUSTICE SCALIA'S JURISPRUDENCE OF TRADITION
As seen, tradition, as a guide for the development of law, has firm roots in
historical experience, both in western legal history, generally, and in American
constitutional history, specifically.14 But, as this section explains, what Justice
Harlan was for tradition in the Warren Court, Justice Scalia has become in the
Rehnquist Court, and much more. For Scalia, the text of the Constitution retains
primacy, for it is the text that actually constitutes "law. 141 In Justice Scalia's view,
however, where the text is ambiguous, judges must look to tradition to give the
words meaning.142 He welcomes the search for original meaning, 143 but eschews
what for him are the fruitless searches for "intent," exemplified in his rejection of
legislative history as an interpretive device. 144 For Scalia, motivations and
intentions are not law; the text is the law, and the text, by its very nature, often
embraces the historical experience of those who selected the words.1 45 This section
will show that Scalia focuses this theory in two important ways: first, he looks to
the most specific tradition available, as specific traditions, as opposed to general
ones, better restrain judges; second, he looks for tradition to provide not merely
138

See, eg., Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 334 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

139

See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

140

See RIGHTS AND DUTIES, supranote 5, at 119.

141

A

MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supranote

17, at 17.

142
See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See
also Pritchard & Zywicki, supra note 19, at 451 (stating that "[t]radition enhances constitutional
interpretation when it allows judges to construe ambiguous or unenumerated rights consistently with the
underlying purposes of constitutionalism.").
143
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 862 (1989) [hereinafter

Originalism].
144
See A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 17 ("It is the law that governs, not the
intent of the lawgiver.... Men may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind
us."). To this extent, Justice Scalia may part company with Judge Bork (to whom he is often compared), who
argues for the validity of the search for original intent (though he describes it as the original "understanding").
See BORK, supra note 127, at 161.
145
See Unwritten Constitution,supra note 24, at I.
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meaning but dated meaning, i.e., the tradition to which we look indicates what the
words meant to those who wrote them. In this way, Scalia attempts to reconcile his
textualism with a tradition-based analysis.
A.

Due Process
1.

Substantive Due Process

Although Justice Scalia has criticized the doctrine of modem substantive
due process by arguing that "process," by definition, lacks substance,' 4 6 he has
nonetheless acquiesced in playing the substantive due process game - but on his
terms. Michael H. v. Gerald D.,'47 in which Justice Scalia wrote the plurality
opinion, represents in some ways Scalia's most important statement on the role of
tradition in interpreting the meaning of "due process of law." Here, the Court
upheld a California statute providing that a child born to a married woman living
with her husband is presumed to be a child of the marriage.1 48 In Michael H., per
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion, the genetic father's attempt to prove a liberty
interest in establishing paternity depended on whether his interest was one
traditionally protected by society. 49 But the case is less relevant for the outcome it
produced and more relevant for the debate about tradition in which Justices Scalia
and Brennan engage.
In the now infamous Footnote Six, Justice Scalia attempted to clarify his
position on tradition's role by stating that the appropriate level of generality to
which the Court must look is the most specific one available.'5 0 Justice Brennan's
dissent responded by attacking Justice Scalia's methodology on its merits.' 5' Justice
Scalia's view of the Constitution, according to Justice Brennan, "ignores the kind
of society in which our Constitution exists."' 5 2 Justice Brennan attacked Scalia's
theory on three grounds: first, identifying the most specific level of tradition is no
easy task;'5 3 second, specificity, as opposed to generality, appears arbitrary and

146

See A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supranote 17, at 142.43.

147

491 U.S. 110 (1989).

148

Id at 113. See CAL. EvID. CODE ANN. § 621 (West Supp. 1989).

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124 ("IT]he legal issue in this case reduces to whether the relationship
between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria (the child) has been treated as a protected family
1,9

unit under the historic practices of our society.").
150
Id. at 127 n.6 ("Though the dissent has no basis for the level of generality it would select, we do:
We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified.").
151

Id. at 137 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Apparently oblivious to the fact that this concept [tradition]

can be as malleable and as elusive as 'liberty' itself, the plurality pretends that tradition places a discernible
border around the Constitution.").
152
Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153

Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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inconsistent with precedent; 54 and third, specific traditionalism is wrong as a
constitutional principle, for it defies both the pluralism of our culture and the fact
that "times change."' 55 Scalia's retort, however, justified his position by appealing
to the judiciary's limited role: "general traditions provide such imprecise guidance
[that] they permit judges to dictate rather than discern society's views.... a rule of
law that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition, is no rule
of law at all."'15 6
But Justice Brennan proved to be only one of Justice Scalia's opponents on
this score. Justice O'Connor, in a terse opinion in which Justice Kennedy joined,
also refused to accept Justice Scalia's version of tradition's importance to
adjudication. 5 7 Concurring in all but Footnote Six of Justice Scalia's opinion for
the plurality, Justice O'Connor concluded that Justice Scalia's view "may be

154

Id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Herein lies the most
powerful language in Justice Brennan's critical dissent:
[wle are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in
which we must be willing to abide someone else's unfamiliar or even repellent practice
because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncrasies .... The document
that the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to me. It is not the living charter that I
have taken to be our Constitution; it is instead a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document
steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long past. This Constitution does
not recognize that times change, does not see that sometimes a practice or rule outlives
its foundations. I cannot accept an interpretive method that does such violence to the
charter that I am bound by oath to uphold.
155

Id.
156
Id. at 127 n.6. For an excellent critique of the Scalia-Brennan Footnote Six debate, see J.M.
Balkin, Tradition,Betrayal, and the Politicsof Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZo L. REv. 1613, 1614-29 (1990).
Professor Balkin criticizes Justice Scalia for offering a view of tradition in Michael H. that "assumes that
traditions are not only discrete, but presumptively normatively correct." Id at 1616. In this sense, Professor
at 1620. But Justice Brennan betrays tradition as
Balkin argues, Justice Scalia actually betrays tradition. Id.
well, according to Professor Balkin, because Justice Brennan "seeks to use a general concept of tradition to

subvert tradition, thus betraying it.... And in doing so, Brennan attempts to elevate a countertradition ...to

constitutional importance." Id at 1625.
See also DAVID E. MARION, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN JR.: THE LAw
101-04 (1997) (describing the philosophical battle in Michael H.

AND POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN DIGNITY

between Justices Scalia and Brennan). Professor Marion's magnificent work explains that, while for Justice
Scalia, "the political community brought into being by the Constitution is an entity with well-defined social,
economic, and political characteristics, for Brennan it is defined less in terms of essential institutions or
practices or traditions and more in terms of the facility it provides for individual expression and selfdetermination." Id. at 104. Mindful that, for those in the founding generation, political communities were
socially constructed, complicated, and often tragic, Professor Marion explains:
the requisites of civilized existence are much less complex for [Brennan] than they were
for James Madison or George Washington or Alexis de Tocqueville. Once freedom to
shape a way of life for oneself becomes the core of dignified existence, all other
consideration of a political, economic, or religious nature can only have a secondary
status. More than this, by casting these considerationsas potential threats to freedom,
it becomes easier to abstract from them when deciding how to resolve immediate
controversies.

Id (emphasis added).
157

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol103/iss1/5

22

Broughton: The Jurisprudence of Tradition and Justice Scalia's Unwritten Con
SCALIA 'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION

2000]

somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this area."'8 Explaining that the
rights found in such cases as Loving v. Virginia59 may not have been drawn from
the most specific level of generality available, Justice O'Connor, in a theme that
has appeared consistently in her later opinions on the role of tradition, would not
"foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical
analysis. ' l' o
Undaunted by the "living" constitutionalism of Justice Brennan and the
precedent-based fears of Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia adhered to his position,
particularly to his theory that tradition as an interpretive tool has the added
advantage of producing judicial restraint. 61 This was made evident in Cruzan v.
Director,MissouriDepartmentof Health.162 There, where Nancy Cruzan's parents
sought to have her removed from the artificial nutrition and hydration devices that
enabled her to live in a persistent vegetative state, the Court upheld a Missouri
evidentiary rule requiring clear and convincing evidence that a terminally ill but
incompetent patient desired removal from the devices keeping her alive.",
Appealing to history and practice, and citing English common law and
Blackstone's proscription of suicide, Justice Scalia's concurrence explains that
"American law has always accorded the State power to prevent, by force if
necessary, suicide. '"'64 While the constitutional text surely protects liberty, Justice
Scalia noted, it does not do so "simpliciter" but only protects liberty from
deprivation without "due process of law.' '1' 6 This means, Justice Scalia urged, that
a claimant must demonstrate "that the State has deprived him of a right historically
and traditionally protected against State interference. That cannot possibly be
established here."'166 Ultimately, Justice Scalia expressed great disappointment that
the Court was willing to engage in playing the substantive due process game at all
in this case, noting that he "would have preferred that we announce, clearly and
promptly, that the federal courts have no business in this field," precisely because
of the particular tradition of proscribing suicide. 67 Nevertheless, having
acknowledged that the substantive due process game was being played, Justice
158

Id.

159
160

388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating state anti-miscegenation law).
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

161

Id at 127 n.6 ("Because such general traditions provide such imprecise guidance, they permit

judges to dictate rather than to discern society's views.").
162
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
163

Id. at 282.

164

Id at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also 4

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*189 (defining

suicide at common law as "deliberately put[ting] an end to [one's] own existence, or commit[ing] any
unlawful malicious act, the consequence of which is [one's] own death").
165
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
166

Id. at 294 (Scalia, J. concurring).

167

Id. at 293 (Scalia, J. concurring).
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Scalia continued to add his flourishes to the playbook.
PlannedParenthoodv. Casey168 presented the next opportunity for Justice
Scalia's defense of tradition, and this time in the most contentious of substantive
due process venues: abortion. Casey involved a Pennsylvania law containing a
number of abortion restrictions, including a requirement of informed consent prior
to obtaining an abortion, parental consent where a minor seeks an abortion, and
spousal notification where a married woman seeks an abortion.' 6 9 The case
addressed the continued legitimacy of Roe v. Wade,170 the Court's 1973 decision
recognizing that the right to obtain an abortion proceeded from the constitutional
right to privacy, which is found in the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause. 171 The Court, in a joint opinion by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, 172 invalidated only the spousal notification provision, arguing as a plurality
that it placed an "undue burden" in the woman's path to exercising the abortion
right,173 and recognized for a Court majority as legitimate the "essential holding" of
Roe, 7 4 though rejecting as a plurality the Roe trimester framework as unnecessary
to that central holding. 175 In the course of their opinion, the joint authors as a
majority also directly took issue with Justice Scalia's Michael H. rationale,
claiming that resort to tradition at its most specific level "would be inconsistent
with our law.' 176 Citing such examples as Loving v. Virginia177 to illustrate its
criticism, the joint opinion argued that Justice Scalia's view of tradition would
result in intolerable abuses by state actors, claiming that the tradition that mattered
most in constitutional adjudication was the Court's tradition of "reasoned

505 U.S. 833 (1992). But see Gottlieb, supra note 21, at 230 (stating that "[d]espite their bow to
tradition in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy have seldom been
mistaken for traditionalists."). Professor Gottlieb makes an interesting point in a most thoughtful piece. The
literature (much of which is cited herein), however, suggests that the point may be better taken with regard to
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy than with regard to Justice Scalia. Nonetheless, the reader is invited to view
the instant article as, generally speaking, mistaking Justice Scalia for a traditionalist.
169
Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§3203-3220 (1990).
168

170

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

171

See generally id.

172

Interestingly, the Caseyjoint opinion is one of only four such opinions in the Court's history. The

other three are: Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958) (all nine justices joining); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976); and Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
173

Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
Id. at 846.

175
176

Id. at 873.
Id. at 847.

177

388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating state anti-miscegenation law, despite the fact that interracial

marriage was illegal in most states in the 1 9 th century). Recall Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Michael H.,
referring to Loving as an example of how rights may sometimes exist apart from specific traditions. Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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judgment."
Justice Scalia, an ardent opponent of the Roe holding who surely hoped to
be part of a majority to overrule the controversial decision, 17s castigated the authors
of the joint opinion for "fabricating" a new version of Roe and for perpetuating a
view of constitutional rights borne merely of abstraction without reason.1 8 In
particular, though, Justice Scalia defended his view of tradition against the joint
opinion's rejection of his Michael H. rationale. 81 Arguing again that the
Constitution provides no protection for "'liberty' in the absolute sense," Scalia
concluded that the right to obtain an abortion is not a liberty "specially protected by
the Constitution . . . because of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says

absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the long-standing traditions of American
society have permitted it to be legally proscribed."1 82
Although the joint opinion chastised Justice Scalia's Michael H. opinion
for concluding that only specific traditions defined "liberty," Justice Scalia
responded "[t]hat is iot what Michael H. says" and clarified Footnote Six: "it
merely observes that, in defining 'liberty,' we may not disregard a specific,
'relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right." 1 83 This
statement appears on its face to imply that, for Justice Scalia, the specific tradition
at issue should not be meant to preclude other authoritative interpretive tools;
rather, the specific tradition simply informs the interpretive process and should not
be ignored. The informing function contains two important components which
represent the theme of Justice Scalia's view of tradition: (1) it gives context to the
meaning of "liberty" in a way that other methods do not; and (2) it limits the range
of interpretive possibilities, thus restraining the judge and maximizing the utility of
the political processes rather than the judicial processes. 18 The joint opinion
178

Casey, 505 U.S. at 848-49. Here, the joint opinion relied upon Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe for

the proposition that the interpretation of the Due Process Clause could not be "reduced to any formula." Poe

v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
179
180

See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 982 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia wrote:
Assuming that the question before us is to be resolved at such a level of philosophical
abstraction, in such isolation from the traditions of American society, as by simply
applying 'reasoned judgment,' I do not see how that could possibly have produced the
answer the Court arrived at in Roe v. Wade. . . . 'reasoned judgment' does not begin by
begging the question, as Roe and subsequent cases unquestionably did by assuming that
what the state is protecting is the 'mere potentiality of life.' ... Roe was plainly wrong

- even on the Court's methodology of 'reasoned judgment,' and even more so (of
course) if the proper criteria of text and tradition are applied.
Id. at 982-83 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
181

Id. at 981 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

182

Id. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

183

Id. at 981 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

184

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 1000-001 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing
the Court's reasoned judgment as mere "personal predilection and moral intuition," and arguing that such
value judgments "should be voted on, not dictated").
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therefore misses the point, in Justice Scalia's view, for it moves1 toward
"systematically eliminating checks upon its own power; and it succumbs."'
Justice Scalia's substantive due process traditionalism remained intact in
the more recent case of County of Sacramento v. Lewis,186 which involved a civil
rights claim against a municipality by the parents of a 16-year-old boy who was
killed during a high-speed police chase. 18 7 Distinguishing legislative from
executive action for substantive due process purposes, Justice Souter's opinion for
the Court held that a substantive liberty claim could arise when the executive action
"shocks the conscience," but not merely when the actor performs negligently or
recklessly. 188 Concurring in the judgment, but criticizing the Court's "atavistic" and
subjective substantive due process methodology, which he viewed as inherently
self-aggrandizing for judges, Justice Scalia explained that "rather than ask whether
the police conduct here at issue shocks my unelected conscience, I would ask
,0189
whether our Nation has traditionally protected the right respondents assert.
Moreover, agreeing that the parents had no textual, historical, or precedential
support for their assertion, the issue was thus one left to the republican process.190
"[T]he people of California and their elected representatives," Justice Scalia wrote,
"may vote their consciences. But for judges to overrule that democratically adopted
policy judgment on the ground that it shocks their consciences is not judicial
review but judicial governance."'1 91
Justice Scalia's substantive due process jurisprudence thus provides a
defense of tradition in the prudentialist, Burkean mold. 192 He validates timehonored social and political practices; he prefers coherence, coherence with history
and with widely held beliefs about the good society, as well as coherence of
context, eschewing abstraction; and he remains eminently positivist, preferring
deference to the competence of the political branches to validate the customs and
beliefs of the body politic, even at the expense of judicial power.' 93 Moreover,
despite his assertions that substantive due process doctrine is oxymoronic and thus

185

Id.at 981 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

186

523 U.S. 833 (1998).

187

See id.

18

Id.at 84748.

189

Id. at 862 (Scalia, J., concurring).

190

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).

191

Id.at 865 (Scalia, J., concurring).

192

See Chow, supra note 10, at 795 (describing Justice Scalia as a model of prudentialist

jurisprudence); Strauss, supra note 2 1, at 1700 (stating that Justice Scalia's problem is that he is "too much of
a Burkean"). See also Broughton, supranote 106, at 97 (comparing Justice Scalia's prudentialism with that
of Justice Harlan, a true Burkean). But see Young, supra note 21, at 623 (concluding that Justice Scalia is not
a Burkean).
193
See Chow, supra note 10, at 795-809 (describing the attributes of prudentialism and giving
examples of'Justice Scalia's conformity to those attributes).
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inherently illegitimate, 194 Scalia has at least engaged in the "game" as we have here
referred to it; his traditionalism is simply the extratextual method by which he

chooses to play (a sort of textualism-plus). Presumably, should a particular tradition
exist to protect a "new" right (in which case, in reality, the right is not new at all),
Scalia would be willing to validate the right and invalidate legislation prohibiting it,
for such a right would
9 5 be necessarily bound by law in the form of a legitimate,
cognizable tradition.
Finding such a tradition in a value-neutral way, however, is for Justice
Scalia the real trick in the game, according to Professors Tribe and Dorf, who
conclude that Justice Scalia's methodology is indefensible. 96 Using Michael H. as
their foundation, the professors argue that the methodology suffers from three
primary flaws: 1) the effort to use tradition to define rights is no more value-neutral
than using precedent to do so;' 97 2) there is no "single dimension of specificity" at
which a judge can successfully look;1 98 and 3) even if judicial neutrality could be
achieved in the tradition-based approach, that neutrality would come at "the
unacceptably high cost" of rejecting the recognition of important individual
rights.' 99 Ultimately, then, Professors Tribe and Dorf conclude that "either...
Justice Scalia's method is designed to overrule virtually all of the Court's decisions
protecting individual rights - a rather unlikely supposition - or, more likely, that it
is a construct to be deployed selectively, allowing judges to define rights more or
less abstractly," depending upon the judge's own views of the importance of those
rights or upon their place on some other "extra-constitutional index. 2 o0
See A MATTER OF INERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 143. See also Laurence H. Tribe, Taking
Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-FormMethod in ConstitutionalInterpretation,108 HARV.
L. REV. 1221, 1297 n. 247 (1995) (admitting that "the basic linguistic point" that substantive due process is
oxymoronic "has great force").
195
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1992) (Scalia,
194

J.concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining the view that if a specific tradition protected a right,
the Court should not disregard that tradition).
196
See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 20, at 98. But see L. Benjamin Young, Justice Scalia's History
and Tradition: The ChiefNightmare in Professor Tribe'sAnxiety Closet, 78 VA. L. REv. 581, 586-87 (1992)
(lamenting the "hand-wringing" of liberal academics over Justice Scalia's conservative jurisprudence and
urging that liberals wage the jurisprudential battle on the conservatives' own terms). Cf Pritchard &
Zywicki, supranote 19, at 451 (stating that "[i]ndiscriminate use of tradition in constitutional interpretation..
. negates the virtues of tradition and undermines the purposes of constitutionalism.").
197
TRIBE & DORF, supra note 20, at 98-99 ("[tlhe lens of the historical camera, in focusing on one
event, necessarily blurs others.").
198

Id. at 101.

199

Id. at 98 ("[Justice Scalia's] tradition-bound approach to constitutional interpretation would

severely curtail the Supreme Court's role in protecting individual liberties"). But see Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (recognizing a due process right in a grandmother to have in her home a
son and grandson, as well as a second grandson who was the cousin of the first), cited with approval in
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,123-24 (1989).
200
TRIBE & DORF,supra note 20, at 109. Indeed, more recently Justice Souter has offered a similar
criticism (and one made clear in the Caseyjoint opinion, as well) of Justice Scalia's methodology that reflects
Justice Souter's decision-based model of tradition. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 '(1992). See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752 (1997)(Souter, J.,
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Procedural Due Process

In Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Matin,2 1 a
California resident filed for divorce against her non-resident husband, who was
subsequently served with process in that state while there only temporarily on
business unrelated to the divorce proceeding. In determining whether the assertion
of personal jurisdiction over the husband was consistent with due process, Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion remarked that the Court has "long relied on the principles
traditionally followed by American courts in marking out the territorial limits of
each State's authority." 20 2 Justice Scalia explained that those principles derived
from English common law, evolved in early American case law, and are reflected
in the continuing practices of the states, thus culminating in the rule that state
courts have jurisdiction over nonresidents who had physical presence in the state. 0 3
Indeed, InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington204 recognized as much in establishing
the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" standard. 20 5 The state
legislatures are free to reject the traditional rule; meanwhile, the validation of the
traditional rule "is its pedigree ....
[w]here ... a jurisdictional principle is both
firmly approved by tradition and still favored, it is impossible to imagine what
standard we could appeal to for the judgment that it is 'no longer justified.'206

As in Michael H., Justice Brennan disputed Justice Scalia's reliance on
tradition as a dispositive factor in due process interpretation.2 7 In an opinion
concurring). In an important concurring opinion in Glucksberg, Justice Souter explained that unenumerated
rights are best understood within the context of Justice Harlan's Poe dissent. Id. at 765 (Souter, J.,
concurring) See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549 (1961)(Harlan, J. dissenting). Pursuant to this
methodology Justice Souter argued that his understanding of unenumerated rights "avoids the absolutist
failing of many older cases without embracing the opposite pole of equating reasonableness with past practice
described at a very specific level." Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring). The essence of this
critique is the demonstration that Justice Scalia's preference for specific traditions commits a different kind of
abstraction, but an abstraction nevertheless, and thus mirrors the argument of professors Tribe and Dorf that
Justice Scalia's methodology is not really value-neutral.
Since his joining the Court in 1990, Justice Souter and Justice Scalia have often butted heads on a
variety of constitutional/interpretational issues. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist.
v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). For a comparison of the
prudentialism of both Justice Scalia and Justice Souter, see Broughton, supra note 106, at 96-108. See also
Pritchard & Zywicki, supra note 19, at 436-45 (evaluating Justice Souter's common law theory of tradition
and contrasting it with Justice Scalia's majoritarian model).
For further criticism of Justice Scalia's method of using tradition, particularly in the Michael H.
context, see BORK, supra note 127, at 240 (stating that even the search for specific tradition "assumes an
illegitimate power" and noting the additional problem of judicial Constitution-making if no specific tradition
can be found).
201
495 U.S. 604 (1990).
202

Id. at 609.

203

Id. at611-15.

204

See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

205

See id. at 316.

206

Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621-22.

207

Id. at 633 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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concurring only in the judgment, Justice Brennan explained,
I do not perceive the need, however, to decide that a jurisdictional
rule that 'has been immemorially the actual law of the land'
automatically comports with due process simply by virtue of its
pedigree. Although I agree that history is an important factor in
establishing whether a jurisdictional rule satisfies due process
requirements, I cannot agree that it is the only factor such that all
traditional rules of jurisdiction are, ipso facto, forever
constitutional. Unlike Justice Scalia, I would undertake an
'independent inquiry into the ... fairness of the prevailing in-state
service rule.'2 8
For Justice Brennan, the tradition that promoted the current personal jurisdiction
rule is a relevant factor only insofar as it gives notice to a defendant that he is
subject to suit where he is voluntarily present in the jurisdiction." 9
Justice Scalia offered a rejoinder in the text of his plurality opinion. The
"contemporary notions of due process" that Justice Brennan would apply are those
that have developed from "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"
that InternationalShoe recognized.21 Beyond the tradition, the only thing left to
which the court may resort is "each Justice's subjective assessment of what is fair
and just."211 Justice Brennan responded by noting that his standard is guided not by
his own "subjective assessment" of fairness and justice, but rather by the several
factors that the Court has developed to determine whether a particular practice
comports with the International Shoe traditional notions test.212 Moreover, for
Justice Brennan, Justice Scalia's rule could possibly operate to the detriment of
many transient out-of-staters, who otherwise may seek shelter under the Privileges
or Immunities and Commerce clauses.21 3 In a final rejoinder, Justice Scalia noted,
"[tihe notion that the Constitution, through some penumbra emanating from the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause, establishes this Court
as a Platonic check upon society's greedy adherence to its traditions can only be
described as imperious. 2 14
The pedigree of procedure also had dispositive value for Justice Scalia in

208

Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring).

209

Id at 636-37 (Brennan, J., concurring).

210

Id. at 622-23.

211

Burnham, 495 U.S. at 623.

212

Id. at 634 n. 7 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of

California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (explaining the factors that Court uses to determine
whether the International Shoe standard is met).
213

Burnham, 495 U.S. at 639 n. 14.

214

Id. at 627 n. 5.
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Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Haslip,215 which questioned whether
21 6
excessive jury discretion in awarding punitive damages violated due process.
Despite the significant award that the Alabama jury returned in that case, Justice
Blackmun's opinion for the Court found that no liberty interest is violated where
the jury instructions and appellate process adequately limited the jury's
discretion.217 Justice Scalia's concurrence criticized the majority, however, for its
shoddy treatment of tradition in searching for the asserted right and reviewing the
contested procedure. 218 Although Justice Blackmun found that the Alabama jury
practices were consistent with the common law, he explained that such practices
did not "' insulate [them] from constitutional attack."' 219 Justice Scalia, on the other
hand, affirmed "our living tradition" of jury-assessed punitive damage awards and

the common law practices, 220 explicated by Coke's explanation of due process in
his Institutes,"21 from which that tradition originated, which tradition "necessarily
constitutes 'due' process.", 2 2 That methodology is apparent, he concluded, in a
number of the Court's precedents, including Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co. and Hurtado v. California."3 Thus, for Justice Scalia, once the
tradition has been ascertained nothing more of the Court is necessary or
desirable.224
Justice O'Connor used her Haslip dissent, in which she concluded that
Alabama's punitive damages scheme was "void for vagueness,', 225 to reiterate her
215

499 U.S. 1(1991).

216

See id.

217

Id.at20-21.

218

Id. at27-28 (Scalia,J.,
concurring).

219

399 U.S. 235, 239 (1970)).
Id.at 18 (quoting Williams v.Illinois,

220

Id.at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring).

221

See 2 COKE, INSTITUTES *50.

As Justice Scalia explained, Coke's view (and hence Justice

Scalia's view) proceeded from the per legum terre ("by law of the land") clause of Magna Carta, which
provided that "[n]o Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or
free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land." 9 Hen. III, ch. 29. For
Justice Scalia, it was this tradition that the framers of the Bill of Rights codified in the Due Process Clause,
which fact is confirmed by the nation's eminent early commentators. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES *661; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
* 10.

222

Haslip. 499 U.S. at 25 (Scalia, J., concurring).

223

concurring). See also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Id. at 29-31 (Scalia, J.,

Co., 18 How. 272, 276 (1856) (referring to Coke and the early state constitutions in comparing "due process
of law" with the per legum terre clause of Magna Carta); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884)
(holding that, although Anglo-American law demonstrated a tradition of following grand jury indictment, a
state's refusal to follow that traditional procedure does not necessarily deny due process).
224
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 39-40.
225

Id. at 53 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)

(requiring the Court in considering what process is due to consider the private interests at stake, the risk of
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objections to Justice Scalia's methodology. These criticisms appeared in her brief
Michael H. concurrence 2 6 and were formalized even further in the Casey opinion
that she authored jointly with Justices Kennedy and Souter.2 7 Justice O'Connor
asserted that Justice Scalia's view was "flatly inconsistent with Mathews," which
requires a "flexible" approach to due process analysis. 2 8 In contrast, she explained,
Justice Scalia's view amounted to the conclusion that due process is a notion fixed
in time, immunized from constitutional objection, and ultimately ignorant of
changes in the law.22 9
In addition, Justice Kennedy offered a concurrence in which he lauded
Justice Scalia's historical approach, agreeing that the "judgment of history should
govern the outcome in the case before us."230 Nevertheless, he expressed less
"confidence" than Justice Scalia in the assertion that traditional practice is
dispositive and forecloses further judicial inquiry. 231 Thus, although Justice
Kennedy has found more jurisprudential common ground with Justice Scalia in
other areas (in criminal law and statutory interpretation, for example), 232 he has
generally proven reluctant to vindicate tradition to the same extent as Justice
Scalia.233
The area of criminal law has also offered Justice Scalia an opportunity'to
explain how tradition informs due process. 234 Schad v. Arizona 23 5 offers a salient
erroneous deprivation of the private interest, and the government interest in avoiding additional procedures).
226
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
227

See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-850 (1992).

228

dissenting).
Haslip,499 U.S. at 60 (O'Connor, J.,

229

Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

230

1l at 40 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

231

See id

232

Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992). In Medina, the Court
On criminal law, see, e.g.,

considered whether a statute requiring that a party asserting the incompetency of a criminal defendant had the
burden of proving the incompetency violated due process. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy, resisting
the temptation to exert "undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and the careful balance
that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order," id at 443, canvassed the common law and concluded
that there was "no historical basis for concluding that the allocation of the burden of proving incompetence to
the defendant violates due process." Id. at 448. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's opinion drew a concurrence from
Justice O'Connor, who, joined by Justice Souter, rejected the Court's "intimation that the balancing of
equities is inappropriate in evaluating whether state criminal procedures amount to due process." Id. at 453
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
On statutory interpretation, and Justice Kennedy's own textualism, see, e.g., Newman-Green, Inc.
v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 839 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Chow, supra note 10, at 805
(describing Justices Scalia and Kennedy as "two leading textualists" on the Court).
233
See, e.g., Michael H.v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,joined by Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
Although his invocation of "tradition" as such has been less pronounced there, Justice Scalia's
234
reliance on historical practices has also influenced his writing in the area of criminal procedure, particularly
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("the path out of this [Fourth Amendment doctrinal] confusion should be sought by returning to
the first principle that the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that
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example. In Schad, the Court upheld against a due process challenge a jury
instruction that did not require the jury to agree on a single alternative theory of
premeditated and felony murder.236 Anticipating Justice Scalia's separate opinion,
Justice Souter added that despite his reliance on history to adjudicate the instant
case, neither "history nor current practice is dispositive;" rather, they are
"significant indicators of what we as a people regard as fundamentally fair" but are
always open to "critical examination. 237 Justice Scalia, concurring in part and in
the judgment, and unsatisfied with Justice Souter's equivocal historical analysis,

offered a lesson in the common law history of murder to demonstrate what process
our nation has traditionally viewed as "due." 238 "'Fundamental fairness' analysis
may appropriately be applied to departures from traditional American conceptions
of due process," Justice Scalia explained. 239 "[B]ut when judges test their individual
notions of 'fairness' against an American tradition that is deep and broad and
continuing, it is not the tradition that is on trial, but the judges., 240 He thus
concluded, based on the common law rule that "was the norm" in 1787, 1868, and
today, "it is impossible that a practice as old as the common law and still in
existence in the vast majority of States does not provide a process which is

the common law afforded."). More recently, Justice Scalia has attempted to redefine the Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in accord with the historical background of that provision. See Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). In Houghton, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, explained the test thusly:
In determining whether a particular governmental action violates this provision, we
inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the
common law when the Amendment was framed. Where that inquiry yields no answer,
we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.
Id. at 299-300 (citations omitted).
In analyzing this statement of the law, one must be struck by Justice Scalia's willingness to
acquiesce in a balancing test as a second step in the process. Moreover, one, in looking to Justice Scalia's
view of due process in particular, may also be struck by Justice Scalia's willingness to concede that the
common law does not always tell us what is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, one would
have expected under Justice Scalia's view that common law and historical practice would be dispositive of
the question, never "yield[ing] no answer." Compare this with the view he expressed above in Acevedo.
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia's appeal to the historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment has
sometimes led to a vindication of individual rights. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 381
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing that seizure of contraband located in one's pockets violates the
Fourth Amendment where the officer manipulates the object in order to ensure that it is contraband, and
stating that "I frankly doubt.., whether the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would
have allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to such
indignity.").
501 U.S. 624 (1991).
235
236

See id. at 645.

237

See id. at 642-43.

238

See id. at 650 (Scalia, J., concurring).

239

Id.

240

Schad, 501 U.S. at 650.
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'due."'

241

Also, in Herrera v. Collins,242 the Court considered the case of a Texas

death row inmate who, ten years after his conviction for capital murder, sought a
federal writ of habeas corpus, claiming tlhat newly discovered evidence
demonstrated that he was actually innocent.243 The prisoner argued that executing
an actually innocent person violated both the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 " In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the
prisoner's claim was insufficient to warrant habeas relief because the prisoner had
not demonstrated an independent constitutional violation in any of the previous
criminal proceedings, 245 nor could he demonstrate that Texas's requirement that
new trial motions be filed within thirty days of sentencing violated principles of
fairness deeply rooted in society's traditions and conscience. 246 Therefore, the
appropriate avenue of relief for prisoners like Herrera, Chief'Justice Rehnquist
explained, is executive clemency, not a federal writ of habeas corpus.247
In another short but important concurrence, Justice Scalia explained his
view that "[t]here is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice (if
that were enough) for finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial
consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after
conviction., 248 This statement clearly does not reject consideration of modem
practices, but merely rejects the notion that modern practice is itself sufficient for

241

id. at 651 (Scalia, J., concurring).

242

506 U.S. 390 (1993).

See id. at 397-98. Leonel Torres Herrera had been convicted of murdering one police officer and
pled guilty to the murder of a second officer. See id. at 393-94. Evidence of his guilt included Herrera's
handwritten letter in which he impliedly admitted his guilt. See id. at 394-95. Ten years later, on his second
federal habeas corpus petition, Herrera offered affidavits, including one from an attorney and former state
court judge, claiming that Herrera's now-deceased brother actually committed the murders. See id. at 396.
244
See id at 393. As for the due process claim here, Chief Justice Rehnquist decided that the case
243

should be viewed as a procedural rather than substantive due process case. See id. at 407 n. 6. The dissenting
opinion ofJustice Blackmun, however, asserted that Herrera's could also be a substantive due process claim.
See id. at 437.
245
See id. at 400.
246

See id. at 411. See also TEx. R. App. PRoc. 21A(a)(i997) (stating that, in order to obtain a new

trial based on after discovered evidence, defendant must file a motion for a new trial within 30 days after
imposition or suspension of sentence).
247
See Herrera,506 U.S. at 411-412. Chief Justice Rehnquist, offering his own appeal to tradition,
stated that "[e]lemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy
for preventing miscarriages ofjustice where judicial process has been exhausted." Id.See also TEX.CONST.
art. IV, § II (providing that the Governor may grant clemency upon the recommendation of a majority of the
Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles); 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 143.1, 143.57, 143.43, 143AI(a) (West
Supp. 1992) (detailing the procedures for granting executive clemency). But see Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 416 (1986) (stating for a plurality of the Court that executive clemency itself is not enough to
vindicate Eighth Amendment rights).
248

Herrera,506 U.S. at 427-28 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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determining whether a state has violated the Constitution. 249 Again, Justice Scalia's
writing reflected his frustration with a constitutional jurisprudence that, in
attempting to solve every problem, avoids giving appropriate deference to historical
practices, ignores the Court's limited role, and ultimately as a result, ignores the
harsh realities of political life.250

Justice Scalia's procedural due process traditionalism is thus an example of
the recurrent themes in his defense of tradition generally: deference to historical
collective actions and customs and a concomitant limitation on judicial discretion.
Professor Greenberger most adequately states the criticism of this position in the
procedural due process area:
[T]o assert as Justice Scalia does that traditions are beyond
reinterpretation is unacceptable. There is too much about them
which may be abhorrent or irrelevant to bind us uncritically.... In
the context of procedural due process, we should accord historical

practices a presumptive validity, but insist that the presumption be
readily rebuttable.2 1
What appears most interesting about Haslip, Burnham, Schad, and Herrera,
however, is Justice Scalia's insistence that it is not mere antiquity that vindicates a
practice; rather, the true test of a tradition's constitutional relevance is its
perpetuation in modernity. 25 2 If such a practice were rejected by a particular
jurisdiction in modernity, presumably Justice Scalia would defer to that
249

On this point, query whether Justice Scalia would be equally concerned about the use of only

historical practices to the exclusion of contemporary practices. Cf Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 39 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to "our living tradition").
250
See Herrera,506 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring). Here Justice Scalia explains:
I nonetheless join the entirety of the Court's opinion, including the final portion . . .
because there is no legal error in deciding a case by assuming, arguendo, that an
asserted constitutional right exists, and because I can understand, or at least am
accustomed to, the reluctance of the present Court to admit publicly that Our Perfect
Constitution lets stand any injustice, much less the execution of an innocent man who
has received, though to no avail, all the process that our society has traditionally deemed
adequate.
Id
See also Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution,56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981) (discussing
the problem raised by those who contend that the Constitution was designed to solve all political and legal
problems).
251
Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia's Due Process Traditionalism Applied to Territorial
Jurisdiction:The Illusion of Adjudication Without Judgment, 33 B.C. L. REv. 981, 1036 (1992). See also
Allen R. Kamp, The Counter-RevolutionaryNature of Justice Scalia's "Traditionalism," 27 PAC. L.J. 99
(1995) (describing Justice Scalia's procedural due process traditionalism as "counter-revolutionary" in the
Anglican tradition, rather than the Roman Catholic one). But see George Kannar, The Constitutional
Catechism ofAntonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1316-17 (1990) (describing Justice Scalia's jurisprudence as
akin to Roman Catholic theology).
252
See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,39 (1991) (Scalia, J. concurring) (referring to
"our living tradition"); Burnham v. Superior Court of California, Marin County, 495 U.S. 604, 615 (1990)
(explaining that the jurisdictional practice at issue "is ... not merely old; it is continuing").
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jurisdiction's collective action, or in other words, its majoritarian
countertraditions.5 3 Justice Scalia's point appears therefore to be only that once a
particular practice has been found in our traditions and not rejected by the
jurisdiction involved, thejudicialinquiry ceases; the tradition is the process that is
due, and thus is itself a part of the Constitution and not merely an interpretive
factor still subject to critical inquiry, as Justice Souter2 4 and Professor
Greenberger 2 suggest.
B.

EqualProtection

Justice Scalia's traditionalism also lurks in the area of equal protection
law. In this area, however, "tradition" appears less pronounced and operates not so
much to explore the dated meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's text but rather
to identify the view that a tradition of color-blindness lives in American
constitutionalism. The Equal Protection Clause reflects this evolving tradition.
Evidence of this phenomena is found in City of Richmond v. JA.Croson
Company.5 In Croson, the Court held that strict scrutiny applied to a municipal
minority set-aside program that awarded a percentage of government contracts to
minority business enterprises. Concurring in the judgment only, Justice Scalia
rejected the assertion in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion that race could
sometimes be used to ameliorate past discrimination.5 7 He offered a historical
basis for his conclusion that the federal courts should be particularly wary of
discrimination at the state level, explaining that, as James Madison recognized of
faction, "racial discrimination against any group finds a more ready expression at
the state and local than at the federal level." 258 This expression of discrimination
historically affected blacks disproportionately, Justice Scalia wrote, but he felt that
this fact without significantly more evidence cannot justify a policy of
discrimination against whites today; "[w]here injustice is the game [] turnabout is

But see, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting
the police practice of manipulating an object in a suspect's pocket to ensure that it is contraband).
Presumably, then, Justice Scalia would still object to the practice described in Dickersoneven if a majority of
Minnesotans approved of it.
254
See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 643 (1991).
253

See Greenberger, supra note 251, at 1035. Professor Greenberger thoughtfully states that to
abolish tradition from due process adjudication "would be an overreaction, and a deleterious one. The
problem is not with looking to tradition per se as a guide to interpretation, which is probably inevitable, but
with doing so exclusively." Id.
256
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
255

257

See id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).

Id. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 10 at 82-84 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (explaining Madison's view that in smaller societies, fewer groups will
exist and, "the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and
execute their plans of oppression.'). Id. at 83.
258
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not fair play. 259

That view, again based less on an express invocation of tradition and more
on an implication that race-consciousness is inconsistent with the values of the
Equal Protection Clause, appeared in Scalia's brief concurrence in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.260 In Adarand, the Court held that all governmental
racial classifications, federal and state alike, must be subjected to strict scrutiny. 6 1

Tracking his line of argument from Croson espousing the general illegitimacy of
race-based policy, Justice Scalia explained his view that
under our Constitution there can be no such thing as a creditor or
debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution's focus upon
the individual. [The same view] is to reinforce and preserve for
future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery,
race privilege, and race hatred. In2 62the eyes of government, we are

just one race here. It is American.

Note that Justice Scalia makes no specific reference to tradition in this statement.
Perhaps for Justice Scalia, like Professor Bickel, the Constitution embraces the
evolving moral sense of the American political structure that racial bias of any sort
infects our culture. This moral sensibility, enshrined in the Equal Protection Clause,
itself constitutes a tradition, or, viewed another way, a superseding historical
countertradition (if one accepts the view that discrimination
based on race could
263
never have legitimately been an American "tradition").
As Croson and Adarand demonstrate, Justice Scalia's jurisprudential
method, when applied to race-consciousness, not only lacks an express reliance
upon tradition (as he has expressed that concept in other areas) but also lacks the
same degree of deference to political majorities and the concomitant judicial
restraint that inevitably accompanies such deference. Such a method may be
distinguished from Justice Scalia's due process jurisprudence. Where race
consciousness is not at issue Justice Scalia proves much more deferential to social
and political custom and convention; instead, he favors a limited judicial role.
In Romer v. Evans,264 the Court, pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause,
invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited state or local
governmental entities from affording legal protections to persons based on
"homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
259

Croson,488 U.S. at 524 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).

260

515 U.S. 200 (1995).

261

Id.

262

Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).

263

See Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring) (indicating agreement with Professor Bickel's

262

assertion that "contemporary history" teaches the immorality and destructiveness of racial discrimination).
See also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975) (explaining the same).
264
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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relationships. 26 In dissent, Justice Scalia returned to the dispositive view of
tradition, describing the Colorado amendment as "a modest attempt by seemingly
tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a
2
politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws." '
Although the Court purported to decide the case under the rational basis standard,
Justice Scalia explained that the Court ignored its most relevant precedent utilizing
such a standard. In Bowers v. Hardwick,the Court relied heavily upon custom and
tradition to reinforce a social and moral standard opposing homosexual conduct.267
If the state can criminalize homosexual conduct, Justice Scalia explained in Romer,
surely a fortiori it can prohibit special protections for those with homosexual
tendencies.268
Ultimately, for Justice Scalia, the case was not about hostility toward
homosexuals but rather society's authority to adopt and enforce a collectivelyviewed moral standard.269 Homosexuals, too, can reinforce their own moral
sentiments, "[b]ut they are subject to being countered by lawful, democratic
countermeasures as well., 270 The Court's insistence upon disrupting the democratic
process amounts to little more than
inventing a novel and extravagant constitutional doctrine to take
the victory away from traditional forces . . . [and] verbally
disparaging as bigotry adherence to traditional attitudes....
Amendment 2 is designed to prevent piecemeal
deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of
Coloradans, and is not only an appropriate means to that
legitimate end, but a means that Americans have employed before.
it down is an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political
Striking
27 1
will.
Justice Scalia used the same strong language in United States v.
Virginia,7 2 decided the same term, which represents his most articulate defense of
tradition in the equal protection area. 3 Purporting to employ the intermediate
scrutiny standard customarily used in gender discrimination cases, but explaining
265

See id.

266

Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Id. at 640 (Scalia, ., dissenting). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (relying
upon the historical practices of virtually every state in making sodomy a crime).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268
267

269

Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

270

Id. at 646 (Scalia, L, dissenting).

271

Id. at 652-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

272

518 U.S. 515 (1996).

273

See id.
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that it required an "exceedingly persuasive" justification from the state, Justice
Ginsburg's opinion for the Court held that the Virginia Military Institute's (VMI)
all-male admission policy violated equal protection. 27 4 The lone dissenter, Justice
Scalia employed tradition to defend VMI's policy, to demonstrate why it satisfied
the customary equal protection standard, and to show what he viewed as the error
inherent in the Court's meddling.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia attacked the majority on the grounds that it
ignored the facts and ignored precedent. Scalia felt that the facts of the case
demonstrated "gender-based developmental differences," which justified VMI's
use of the "adversative" method to train only males. He also argued that the
majority ignored precedent - "drastically revis[ing] our established standards for
reviewing sex-based classifications" - and history - "count[ing] for nothing the
long tradition, enduring down to the present,276of men's military colleges supported
by both States and the Federal Government.,
Justice Scalia's references to tradition are voluminous in Virginia. He
asserts that it is the Court's function to "preserve our society's values regarding
(among other things) equal protection, not to revise them. 277 He reiterates the
danger inherent in drawing abstract rights from abstract legal "tests," saying such
tests "cannot supersede - and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect - those
constant and unbroken national traditions that embody the people's understanding
of ambiguous constitutional texts., 278 He also explains his view that, while
traditions must evolve, develop, and even become modified, it is the place of the
nation's republican institutions to effectuate those changes:
[T]he tradition of having government-funded military schools is as
well rooted in the traditions of this country as the tradition of
sending only men into military combat. The people may decide to
change the one tradition, like the other, through democratic
processes; but the assertion that either tradition has been
unconstitutional through the centuries is not law, but politics274

Id. at 534 (citations omitted).

Id. at 567 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's introduction contained these harsh words:
[t]o counterbalance the Court's criticism of our ancestors, let me say a word in their
praise: They left us free to change. The same cannot be said of this most illiberal Court,
which has embarked on a course of inscribing one after another of the current
preferences of the society (and in some cases only the counter-majoritarian preferences
of the society's law-trained elite) into our Basic Law. Today it enshrines the notion that
no substantial educational value is to be served by an all-men's military academy - so
that the decision by the people of Virginia to maintain such an institution denies equal
protection to women who cannot attend that institution but can attend others. Since it is
entirely clear that the Constitution of the United States - the old one - takes no sides in
this educational debate, I dissent.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
276
Id. at 566 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
275

277

Id.at 568 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

278

Romer, 517 U.S. at 568 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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Scalia's view may be summarized in this case by one simple quote: "the Court's
made-up tests cannot displace long-standing national traditions as the primary
determinant-ofwhat the Constitution means. 28 0
Scalia's language suggests that he now views tradition as relevant to all
interpretive efforts, even those in which the constitutional text is unambiguous.281
This notion indicates that tradition is more than just a factor in interpretation, as
Scalia's Casey explanation seems to urge.282 Rather, in Virginia Scalia suggests
that, when available, tradition is dispositive and gives ultimate meaning to all
constitutional language.
If, however, Scalia did not intend in his Virginia dissent to assert that
tradition is dispositive on the issue of constitutional interpretation, an inconsistency
arises. If Scalia believes that the Equal Protection Clause is in fact unambiguous
then his view that tradition should be used to establish the "people's understanding
of ambiguous constitutional texts" seems misplaced. For if his view is that the
Equal Protection Clause is unambiguous, then the resort to tradition is superfluous,
unnecessary, and, tracking his theory from the due process area, dangerously
illegitimate. Conversely, if it is his position that the Equal Protection Clause is
ambiguous (as to most of us it is), then his statement in Virginia is too broad and
should be reconciled with his language in other cases, which suggest that while
tradition is always useful in examining the structure and development of the
Constitution's rights and powers, the Court should use it as an interpretive tool only
when the Constitution's meaning is not clear on the face of the text.2
The Virginia dissent also raises broader questions about Scalia's views of
tradition in the equal protection arena. If tradition determines constitutional
meaning for Scalia, and if the Equal Protection Clause is ambiguous and requires
resort to tradition, why is tradition virtually invisible in his race-consciousness
jurisprudence? Is the Equal Protection Clause somehow less ambiguous when
applied to cases of'racial discrimination than when it is applied to cases of gender
discrimination? Clearly, where race-based policies are at issue, Justice Scalia is
uncomfortable deferring to the political branches. Romer and Virginia, which
address equal protection in the gender and sexual orientation context, however,
suggest no such uneasiness.

279

Id. at 569 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

280

Id. at 570 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

281

Cf Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 95-96 n. 1 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating "I

argue for the role of tradition in giving content only to ambiguous constitutional text; no tradition can
supersede the Constitution.").
282
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1992) (Scalia,
J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that Michael H. stands for the proposition that the
Court simply may not "disregard" tradition in defining liberty, though*"liberty" may mean more than this

tradition indicates).
See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 95-96 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).

283
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Perhaps the answer to these questions lies in an unarticulated vision of a
color-blind tradition in the Constitution. Certainly, Justice Scalia's opinions
regarding racial discrimination suggest this possibility. This view would be
consistent with an evolving, morality-centered vision of tradition which has
affected America's race-relations since the Civil War. This view must, however,
account for a conflicting (though now devolving, thanks to the Court) legislative
countertradition that sees remedial racial policy as both legitimate and moral.

Furthermore, this view must account for the argument, made most forcefully by
Professor Hayman, that traditions of both color-blindness and of affirmative action
are themselves illusory.2 8
C.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Justice Scalia's use of tradition as the "primary determinant of what the
Constitution means" tends to produce two practical results: it tends to favor
republican (though Justice Scalia most often refers to them as "democratic") 285
outcomes adopted in the political branches, and it tends to circumscribe judicial
review. This trend is equally clear, if not most clear, in Justice Scalia's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, in which history and political
custom help define the
286
meaning of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment.,
Thompson v. Oklahoma8 7 involved application of that state's death penalty
statute to a young man who, at the age of fifteen, was an active participant in his
brother-in-law's grisly murder.288 A plurality of the Court found that our "evolving
standards of decency" 289 precluded the execution of someone who had committed
See Hayman, supra note 10, at 73. Professor Hayman explains his view that the problem with
"traditions" of "color-blindness," "civil rights," "quotas," "equal opportunity," "affirmative action," and
"school busing" "is not merely that they are unknowable; it is that, as coherent entities, they simply do not
exist." Id.
285
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 646 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
2B4

homosexuals are subject to "lawful, democratic counter-measures").
286
See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, The Constitutionand CriminalPunishment: The Emerging Visions of
Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 603-609 (1995) (explaining Justice Scalia's death
penalty jurisprudence).
Professor Smith has done much work on Justice Scalia's criminal justice
jurisprudence that is well worth consideration. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, Justice Antonin Scalia and
CriminalJustice Cases, 81 KY. L.J. 187 (1992-93); CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, Justice Antonin Scalia and The
Supreme Court's Conservative Moment (1993).
Cf. STEVEN G. GEY, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. L. REV. 67, 102 (1992)
(concluding, inter alia, that Justice Scalia "seems to believe that there are virtually no limits on a state's
imposition of the death penalty); SAMUEL J.M. DONNELLY, CapitalPunishment: A Critique of the Political
and PhilosophicalThought Supporting the Justices' Positions, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1992) (providing an
interesting examination of the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence and the philosophical dispositions of
the Justices, including Justice Scalia, in this area).
287
487 U.S. 815 (1988).
288

The evidence demonstrated that Thompson's brother-in-law was shot twice and had his throat,

chest, and abdomen cut by four perpetrators, one of whom was Thompson. Id.at 819. The victim's body
was then "chained to a concrete block and thrown into a river where it remained for almost four weeks." Id.
289
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (stating for a plurality that the "evolving standards of
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his offense before reaching the age of sixteen.290 Justice O'Connor provided the
fifth vote, and in her concurrence purported to prefer deference to "the people's
elected representatives" where states, unlike Oklahoma, actually set a minimum age
for execution by statute.29' But Justice Scalia's vigorous dissent asked whether
there existed a national consensus, "sufficiently uniform and of sufficiently long
standing," opposing the execution of a defendant under the age of sixteen.292 His
answer was that no such convention exists and that, therefore, the Court is
unwarranted in interfering with the customs adopted by the people of Oklahoma.293
Justice Scalia first found persuasive the common law view, enunciated by
Blackstone, that persons under age fifteen were not immune from conviction for
capital crimes. 294 Second, having identified a historical tradition approving of such
executions, Justice Scalia sought to determine whether a superseding
countertradition had developed.295 To determine whether a countertradition
developed, Scalia examined legislation, which he considered the "most reliable
objective sign" of society's views about a particular punishment. 9 The trend, he
noted, was actually to decrease, not increase, the age for juvenile liability both for
state and federal crimes. 297 As for the statistical evidence that the plurality
proffered, Scalia felt that the data merely demonstrated that society preferred
executions of those under age sixteen to be rare, but not eliminated. Scalia
explained that "there is no justification for converting a statistical rarity of
occurrence into an absolute constitutional ban." 298
Thus, Scalia opined that because a relevant, identifiable tradition existed
which approved executing juveniles under the age of sixteen, and because society,
as seen in legislative custom, did not oppose the practice, the Court should not
interfere in the application of Oklahoma's death penalty statute.299 To do so, as he
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" are those to which judges should look).
290

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822-23.

291

Id. at 857-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

292

Id. at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

293

Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).

294

Id. at 864 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23-24 (explaining

that at common law children under age seven could not be held capitally liable, while children under age 14
were rebuttably presumed to be immune from capital punishment).
295
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 864-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
296

Id. at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

297

Id. at 867 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Here Justice Scalia noted the provision of the death penalty for

many federal death criminal statutes and explained that even if it were appropriate to consider the motivations
of lawmakers when passing upon the question of a national consensus, these statutes indicate that "it would

be strange to find the consensus regarding criminal liability of juveniles to be moving in the direction the
plurality perceives for capital punishment, while moving in precisely the opposite direction for all other
penalties." Id. at 866 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
298
Id. at 870-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
299

See id. at 873-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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expressed in Romer, is to indulge only the personal moral sensibilities of the
Justices rather than those of the society, who is better-suited to determine what is

"cruel and unusual" punishment."ro
But vengeance, so to speak, was given to Justice Scalia in the following
term. In Stanford v. Kentucky, °1 the Court was faced with the question of whether
the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of Stanford, who was seventeen
years old when he and an accomplice raped and sodomized a twenty-year-old
woman during a gas station robbery, finally shooting her pointblank in the face and
in the back of her head. 0 2 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, explained, as he did
in Thompson, that the determination of what constitutes "cruel and unusual"

punishment follows a two step-analysis: first, whether there is an identifiable
tradition of imposing a particular punishment that prevailed when the Eighth
Amendment was adopted; and second, whether our society has rejected that
tradition and developed a superseding countertradition of punishment which
reflects America's "evolving standards of decency. 30 3
As to the question of the presence of a tradition, Justice Scalia reiterated
his conclusion from Thompson that the historical record demonstrates approval of
capital liability for those age fifteen and above. 3 0 In fact, Scalia noted, because the
presumption of incapacity at age fourteen was rebuttable at common law, even a
defendant over the age of seven could possibly be executed. 305
As to the second question, whether a countertradition had developed,

Scalia again considered the most objective means to answer this question was
legislation. 3a

In the United States, Justice Scalia explained, most of the states

which authorize the death penalty permit the execution of those age sixteen or

300

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting) Here Justice Scalia also responded to Justice

O'Connor's suggestion that 15-year-olds must be explicitly named in death penalty statutes to indicate that
the legislature intended them to be among the class of death-eligible defendants. If this be so, he wrote, "why
not those of extremely low intelligence, or those over 75, or any number of other appealing groups as to
which the existence of a national consensus regarding capital punishment may be in doubt"? Id.at 877
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Ultimately, he explained, "the concurrence's approach is a Solomonic solution to the
problem ...Solomon, however, was not subject to the constitutional constraints of the judicial department of
a national government in a federal, democratic system." Id. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
301
492 U.S. 361 (1989).
302

See id. at 365.

303

See id. at 368-69. Justice Scalia further enunciated this view in a separate opinion in which he

agreed that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the execution of a mentally retarded defendant. See Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 351 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
explained that if the punishment is not "unusual, that is, if an objective examination of laws and jury
determinations fails to demonstrate society's disapproval of it, the punishment is not unconstitutional even if
out of accord with theories of penology favored by Justices of this Court." Id.
304
305

Stanford,492 U.S. at 368.
See id.at 368. See also 4

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*23-24 (explaining that children over

age seven could be held criminally liable at common law).
306

Stanford,492 U.S. at 370.
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older. 307 Moreover, he felt that it is not the state's burden to prove a national
consensus in favor of the punishment, but rather the burden is on the defendant to
show a national consensus against it. Merely citing polling data or the views of
various interest groups, Scalia stated, cannot prove a national consensus against
execution. 0a "A revised national consensus," Justice Scalia explained, "must
appear in the operative acts (laws and the application of laws) that the people have
approved," and be "so broad, so clear, and so enduring as to justify a permanent
prohibition upon all units of democratic government."30 9 To place such judgments
about contemporary morals merely in the hand of judges, Scalia stated, "is to
replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings. 31 °
Much like Justice Harlan before him, Justice Scalia's Eighth Amendment
traditionalism indicates a willingness to move beyond social practices with a
centuries-long pedigree.3 11 Indeed, he accepts the notion that American society's
perspectives about the moral connection between crime and punishment evolve to
the point that political communities may reject a particular sanction once deemed
acceptable.312 As Thompson and Stanford indicate, however, such an evolution of
tradition must exist in more than the moral intellect of the Justices themselves; it
must rather be reflected in a considered intellectual countertradition enshrined in
positive law.313
307

See id at 371.

308

See id at 373.

310

Id at 377.
Id at 379. See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,351(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment permits certain punishments even though they may be
"out of accord with theories of penology favored by Justices of this Court").
311

See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.dissenting) (explaining that "tradition is a

living thing"); see also Broughton, supranote 106, at 97.
312
See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 877 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the
Court should avoid interfering with state sovereignty by requiring a particular form of legislation, thus
leaving the states free to restrain the manner in which they execute juveniles or to abolish capital punishment,
if the states deem it to be a good idea to do so).
See also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (arguing that in non-capital cases, the Eighth
Amendment does not require proportionality). In Harmelin, the defendant was sentenced to life in prison
under a Michigan mandatory sentencing scheme for possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine. See id. at
961. Delivering the Court's judgment, but joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist for most of the opinion,
Justice Scalia traced the history of the English common law, Magna Carta, and the Court's Eighth
Amendment precedents, to conclude that the Eighth Amendment did not require proportionality in
sentencing. See id. at 990. Justice Scalia purported, however, to adhere to the Court's capital precedents,
concluding that those cases recognized that "[p]roportionality review is one of several respects in which we
have held that 'death is different,' and have imposed protections that the Constitution nowhere else provides.
Id. at 994. "We would leave it there, but will extend it no further." Id. Harmelin thus is another indicator of
the role that history plays in Justice Scalia's determination of what is "cruel and unusual," and how a
society's views about a particular punishment can change over time.
313
Stanfora 492 U.S. at 378. Justice Scalia writes here,
[petitioners] are correct in asserting that this Court has not 'confined the prohibition
embodied in the Eighth Amendment to 'barbarous' methods that were generally
outlawed in the 18 "h century,' but instead has interpreted the Amendment 'in a flexible
and dynamic manner.' In determining what standards have 'evolved,' however, we have
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The FirstAmendment

Although tradition usually plays a limited role in Scalia's First
Amendment decisions, where tradition expressly plays a role in Scalia's First
Amendment decisions he tends to validate the government's interests. Those who
argue that rights always lose in Justice Scalia's constitutional world, however,
sometimes fail to acknowledge his decisions under the First Amendment, in which
he has vindicated the rights of some unpopular litigants and causes. 4 For example,
Justice Scaliajoined the majority in Texas v. Johnson,315 which recognized that the
First Amendment protects the burning of the American flag. 6 In R.A. V v. St.
Paul,317 he wrote a majority opinion which invalidated an ordinance Scalia found to
be bias-motivated crimes ordinance and so overbroad that it infringed the free
speech rights of a defendant who burned a cross on a black family's lawn.31 8 Also,
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah319, he joined in striking
down a local ordinance that prohibited live animal sacrifices, concluding that the
facially neutral law was covertly directed at a particular religious group and thus
violated the Free Exercise Clause.320 Curiously (particularly in light of his
suggestion in Virginia that tradition is dispositive when construing the
Constitution), however, tradition plays little role in Scalia's written decisions.
In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,321 the Court held that the First
Amendment prohibits promotions, transfers, and recalls of low-level public

looked not at our own conceptions of decency, but to those of modern American society
as a whole.
Id.
314

See David Schultz, Scalia on Democratic Decision Making and Long Standing Traditions: How

Rights Always Lose, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 319 (1997) (explaining that Justice Scalia's jurisprudence of
tradition is always used to reject the recognition of rights). Professor Schultz is correct in his assertion that an
explicit defense of tradition has not led Justice Scalia to recognize previously unrecognized constitutional
rights. Justice Scalia has, however, cited with approval the Court's use of tradition to do so in some

instances. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-24 (1989), citing with approval Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (recognizing broad rights of family association based on the
sanctity of the family in American tradition). Moreover, Justice Scalia recognizes that many of the rights
found in the common law tradition have been placed in the text of the Bill of Rights, and most particularly in
the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (recognizing the right
to be free from intrusive patdown searches); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (stating "I have no
difficulty with the proposition that [the reasonableness component of the Fourth Amendment] includes the
requirement of a warrant, where the common law required a warrant."). Surely, the common law would be
considered a"long standing tradition."
315
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
316

See id.

317

505 U.S. 377 (1992).

318

See id.

319

508 U.S. 520 (1993).

320

See id.

321

497 U.S. 62 (1990).
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employees based solely on political affiliation and belief.322 In dissent, Justice
Scalia identified a long constitutional history of providing greater deference to the
government when it acts as employer rather than as "regulator of private
conduct. '323 Faced with such a history, Justice Scalia easily concluded that the
practice is presumably constitutionally valid. 24 In what Justice Stevens'
concurrence described as a "startling assertion," 325 Justice Scalia applied to the
First Amendment context the Burkean theory that has become familiar to his
jurisprudence in other areas of constitutional law:
[t]he provisions of the Bill of Rights were designed to restrain
transient majorities from impairing long-recognized liberties.
They did not create by implication novel individual rights
overturning accepted political norms. Thus, when a practice not
expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the
endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and
unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic,
we have no proper basis for striking it down. Such a venerable and
accepted tradition is not to be laid on the examining table and
scrutinized for its conformity to some abstract principle of First
Amendment adjudication devised by this Court. To the contrary,
such traditions are themselves the stuff out of which the Court's
principles are to be formed. .

.

. I know of no other way to

formulate a constitutional jurisprudence that reflects, as it should,
the principles adhered to, over time, by the American people,
rather than those favored by the personal (and necessarily shifting)
philosophical dispositions of a majority of this Court.326
Moreover, in response to Justice Stevens' concern, Justice Scalia explained
32 7
that this traditionalism did not supersede clear constitutional text.328
footnote
in a
Thus, for example, Justice Stevens' invocation of Brown v. Board of Education
to demonstrate the dangerousness of his position is "unsupportable" because: first,
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments make "crystal clear" that the
race;" and second, no
government may not "treat people differently because of their
329
"tradition of unchallenged validity" existed prior to Brown.
322

See id.

323

Id. at 94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

324

See id. at 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

325

See id. at 80 (Stevens, J., concurring).

326

Id.at 95-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

327

Rutan, 497 U.S. at 95 n. I (Scalia, J., dissenting).

328

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

329

Rutan, 497 U.S. at 95 n. 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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This adherence to tradition, as seen in the substantive due process cases
and in Romer, also has a way of reinforcing morality-which Scalia believes to
justify reliance on tradition in First Amendment jurisprudence as well as in other
areas of law.330 In Barnes v. Glen Theatre,33' two Indiana nude dancing
establishments invoked the First Amendment to challenge a state public nudity
statute which Indiana courts interpreted to require nude dancers to cover their
sexual organs.332 The Court rejected the challenge, holding that the law was
content-neutral and not aimed to suppress free expression. 3 Justice Scalia
concurred, recognizing that any suppression of communicative conduct under the
statute was merely incidental to the state's effort to foster other interests. 334 Those
interests, he explained, relate to public morality and are based on a long tradition of
moral sentiment opposing nudity in public. 33 "Our society prohibits, and all human
societies have prohibited," Justice Scalia wrote, "certain activities not because they
harm others but because they are considered in the traditional phrase, 'contra bonos
mores,' i.e., immoral. '3
Scalia also responded to the assertion in Justice White's dissent that the
purpose of the law, to protect others from moral offense, could not possibly apply
where only paying and consenting patrons could see the nude dancing. 3a He stated
that"[the] purpose of the Indiana statute [is] to enforce the traditional moral belief
that people should not expose their private parts indiscriminately, regardless of
whether those who see them are disedified. 338
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Amendment 2
was a "modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the
efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws.").
330

331

501 U.S. 560 (1991).

332

See id.

333

See id. at 567-68.

See id. at 573-74 (Scalia, J., concurring).
The views that Justice Scalia expressed in Barnes were reiterated recently in another nude dancing case. See
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 120 S.Ct. 1382, 1400-02 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in thejudgment). In Pap's,
Justice Scalia argued that "[w]hen conduct other than speech itself is regulated, it is my view that the First
Amendment is violated only 'where the govemment prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative
attributes."' Id.at 1402 (quoting Barnes, 501 U.S. at 577). He continued, "even if one hypothesizes that the
city's object was to suppress only nude dancing, that would not establish an intent to suppress what, if
anything, nude dancing communicates." Id. "The traditional power of government to foster good morals
(bonos mores), and the acceptability of the traditional judgment (if Erie wishes to endorse it) that nude public
dancing itselfis immoral, have not been repealed by the First Amendment." Id.
335
See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 573 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Indiana's statute is in the line of a long
334

tradition of laws against public nudity, which have never been thought to run afoul of traditional
understanding of "the freedom of speech."').
336
Id. at 575 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). See also Pap's, 120 S.Ct. at 1402 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (explaining his view that the First Amendment did not repeal the "traditional power of government
to foster good morals (bonos mores)").
337
338

See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 590-91 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.at 575 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). In a typically humorous turn of phrase to make a point, Justice
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The preservation of public interests through reliance upon long-recognized
practices is also an element of Scalia's religious liberty jurisprudence. 33 9 For
example, in Lee v. Weisman,"4 the Court held that a Jewish Rabbi's invocation at341
a
public school graduation ceremony amounted to an establishment of religion.
Relying upon a narrow construction of the Establishment Clause, Justice Scalia
offered a historical lecture on public invocations of religion. He noted such
examples as the "history and tradition of our Nation" regarding public prayers of
thanksgiving and the traditional practice of opening legislative ceremonies with a
chaplain's prayer. 32 In addition to the "general tradition of prayer at public
ceremonies," Scalia continued, "there also exists a more specific tradition of
invocations and benedictions at public-school graduation exercises."' 3 These
traditions, he concluded, help inform our understanding of the relationship between
Scalia explained that:
there is no basis for thinking that our society has ever shared that Thoreauvian "youmay-do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-injure-someone-else" beau ideal - much
less for thinking that it was written into the Constitution. The purpose of Indiana's
nudity law would be violated, I think, if 60,000 fully consenting adults crowded into the
Hoosier Dome to display their genitals to one another, even if there were not an
offended innocent in the crowd.
Id, at 574-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Cf Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a state
tax exemption for religious books and articles did not violate the Establishment Clause). Justice Scalia,
dissenting from the Court's conclusion that the Texas tax exemption amounted to an endorsement of religion,
stated:
[tioday's decision introduces a new strain of irrationality in our Religion Clause
jurisprudence. . . . It is not right - it is not constitutionally healthy - that this Court
should feel authorized to refashion anew our civil society's relationship with religion,
adopting a theory of church and state that is contradicted by current practice, tradition,
and even our own case law.
Id at 45 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 397-401 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (further criticizing, in a brief but linguistically
powerful separate opinion, the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971)).
Another interesting decision that Justice Scalia wrote concerning religious liberty (in the Free
Exercise context) that did not explicitly use tradition as its basis is Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990). In Smith, Justice Scalia argued that the Free Exercise Clause does not require religious
exemption from neutral, generally applicable laws, such as (as was the case here) criminal prohibitions on the
use of peyote, that are designed to advance the legitimate health, safety, and welfare concerns of the people.
Id at 879-80. The effect of this decision was the repudiation (though not overruling) of the compelling
interest test in Free Exercise cases, enunciated in Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Smith produced an
immediate outcry from religious liberty proponents, civil rights organizations, and Congress. See Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994) (restoring the compelling interest test), invalidatedin
part by City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See also Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom
RestorationAct, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 221 (stating that Smith "held that every American has a right to
believe in a religion, but no right to practice it"); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHi. L. REv. 1109, 1111 (1990) (arguing that "Smith is contrary to the deep logic of
the First Amendment").
340
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
339

341

See id.

342

Id. at 633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

343

Id. at 635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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church and state and the pervasive historical acceptance of prayer in American
public life.344 Justice Scalia admitted that our constitutional traditions oppose
government endorsement of religion where the endorsement is sectarian. 34 5 Those
same traditions, Scalia countered, also validate nonsectarian, nondenominational
religious invocations in state-sponsored settings. 3 Ultimately, Justice Scalia
concluded that the Court has merely latched onto abstractions "that are not derived
from, but positively conflict with, our long-accepted constitutional traditions. 34 7
Justice Scalia's use of tradition in First Amendment case law, then, is
similar to his use of tradition in other areas; it demonstrates a preference for
positivism and a disapproval of judicial discretion. What appears most interesting,
however, is the absence of a strong expression of tradition when he vindicates First
Amendment rights. For example, Justice Scalia claims in Rutan that identifiable
traditions do not supersede unambiguous text.34 8 But it is unclear whether Scalia
feels that the Free Speech Clause is less ambiguous than the Due Process Clause,
which he admits requires an examination of tradition for its meaning."
If applied consistently, one would expect tradition to play as important a
role in free speech cases concerning hate-crime ordinances as in those concerning
patronage. In Johnson, for example, why not defer to America's long tradition of
protecting the flag, as explained in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in that case?350
If it is because the Free Speech Clause adopted a historical countertradition of
political dissent that includes flag burning, why not say so in a separate opinion, for
surely that was not the point made by Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court? In
R.A. V., why not vindicate the living American tradition of punishing fighting words
as nonspeech, or in punishing hateful conduct (such as burning a cross on one's
lawn) as immoral? If it is because the Free Speech Clause contains a historical
countertradition which disapproves of overbroad legislation that targets viewpoint
or otherwise protected expression, why not simply admit it?
Generally, Justice Scalia's traditionalism in other areas, though not wholly
accepted by his colleagues, is consistent even though it tends to produce unpopular
results. 51 Its application in the First Amendment (in particular, free speech) area,
however, has at times proven inconsistent, if not bewildering, and suggests that one
344

See id. at 641-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

345

See id. at 641 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

346

Lee, 505 U.S. 577 at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

347

Id. at 644 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

348

See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 65 n. 1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

349

See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989).
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 422 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("For more than 200

350

years, the American flag has occupied a unique position as the symbol of our Nation, a uniqueness that
justifies a govemmental prohibition against flag burning in the way respondent Johnson did here").
351
For example, Justice Scalia's consistency in the substantive due process area is evident in, e.g.,
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
980 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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of two cures may be required: either an admission that the Free Speech Clause is
unambiguous and thus does not require resort to tradition; or an explanation that,
like the remainder of the Constitution, the text of the Free Speech Clause is
ambiguous and is informed by traditions and countertraditions which give it
meaning generally and also in particular cases. The latter is preferable and most
consistent with his use of tradition in other areas, as well as with his preference for
rules; the former is difficult to support.
IV. JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION

What, then, is one to make of the concept of "tradition" in Justice Scalia's
writing? Justice Scalia's use of tradition indicates that, for him, something "more"
exists beyond the language of the Constitution. In a brief introductory note to a
symposium conducted by the HarvardJournal of Law and Public Policy, Justice
Scalia addressed the question: is there an unwritten Constitution?352 On its surface,
Scalia's answer seems ambiguous. On the one hand, he writes, "'[o]f course not.'
No judge, in any court, applying what purports to be a principle of constituffinal
law that overrides the activities of the legislature or the executive, appeals to
anything except the written Constitution."35 3 One the other hand, Justice Scalia
explains, the answeir is "Of course.... Many, if not most, of the provisions of the
Constitution do not make sense except as they are given meaning by the historical
background in which they were adopted." 3s
But what may seem ambiguous about Scalia's explanation merely
represents an honest personal assessment of his jurisprudence. It reflects a vision of
the constitutional scheme that both appreciates the value of the written word as the
primary guide for settling legal disputes in a regime governed by a written Basic
Law and by written codes of conduct, as well as the value of looking to beliefs and
customs that give context, and content, to positive laws. Scalia's vision admires the
organic, symbiotic relationship between the lex scripta and our own mores
majorum.3"' As demonstrated in his jurisprudence, then, Justice Scalia's Burkean
traditionalism thus adheres to an unwritten Constitution that functions "as a kind of
rule and
measure of what can or ought to be contrived by and committed to positive
36
law." 5
A.

The Unwritten ConstitutionExamined and Contrasted
Justice Scalia's jurisprudence of tradition tracks the kind of unwritten
Unwritten Constitution, supra note 24, at 1.

352

s3
3S4

Id
Id.
See Russell Hittinger, The Unwritten Constitution and the Conservative's Dilemma, 30

INTERCOLL.
3S6

RV. 58, 60 (1994) [hereinafter The Unwritten Constitution].

Introduction, supranote 25, at xx.
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Constitution that Professor Kirk defended so eloquently.367 Beginning from the
proposition that "an order is bigger than its laws, 3 8 Professor Kirk explained that
the unwritten Constitution, which coexists harmoniously with the written one,
consists of the "political compromises, conventions, habits, and ways of living
together in the civil social order that have developed among a people over the
centuries." 35 9 Indeed, the unwritten Constitution represents even more. It also refers
to the "order that obtains" once the roots of that order - the traditions, longdeveloped, from which it grew - "are filtered through the practices of an actual
people." 36 Thus, the roots of our constitutional, social, and political regime are
evidenced in many places, not just in one single abstract theory of government.
These roots originate in the Hebrew legal tradition, in the Greek concept of nomos,
in the development of the tripartite system of law that marked the Roman mores
majorum, and, most especially, in the development of the common law of England.
361 What these very different roots have in common, however, is their collective
influence upon the creation of order, the delicate balancing of liberty, and authority
that underlies both the written and unwritten Constitutions.36 2
Traces of this prudential constitutional theory abound in the cases
discussed in this article. Casey provides a clear example. In Casey, Justice Scalia
first instructs us that he knows abortion is not a right specially protected by the
Constitution because the text of the Constitution "says absolutely nothing about it"
and because "the longstanding traditions of the American people have permitted it
to be legally proscribed. 38 3 If the written document, which is the positive law of
the Constitution, is all that mattered, Justice Scalia's second argument would be
superfluous. His willingness to move to the second argument, however,
demonstrates that something more is at work in constitutional interpretation than
merely viewing the constitutional text as a laundry list of rights and powers subject
to expressio unius est exclusio alterius36 4 (which probably proves question-begging

in many instances anyway, where the point is to determine what the text means in
the first place).
357

See generally RIGHTS AND

DUTIES,

supra note 5, at 249-261 (explaining the virtues of the

unwritten Constitution).
358

ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER, supranote 3, at 5.

359

Introduction, supranote 25, at xviii.

360

Introduction,supranote 25, at xvii-xix.

361

See supra,Section II and accompanying notes.

362

See RIGHTS AND DUTIES, supra note 5, at 14-15.

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
363

Translated, "the expression of one thing means the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990). For a good general discussion of this doctrine for interpreting written laws,
364

see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & PHILIP P. FRiCKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF

PUBLIC POLICY 638-39 (1995). As Professors Eskridge and Frickey note, Justice Scalia has invoked this
doctrine in the statutory interpretation arena. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
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The point also is made in Rutan, where Justice Scalia assures us that
"when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the
endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that
dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it
down." 36 5 Finally, in Virginia, Justice Scalia explains that it is our "longstanding
national traditions" that are the "primary determinant of what the Constitution
means." 3r Where traditions, conflict, he explains, the people can "change the one
tradition, like the other, through democratic processes." Scalia maintains, however,
that it is not for the Court to mandate the change.367
In addition to the cases in which Justice Scalia explicitly uses tradition as
an interpretive tool, it is important to note that he sees a tradition of federalism that
also enlightens his unwritten Constitution. For example, in College Savings Bank v.
FloridaPrepaidPostsecondary Education Expense Board,3 a New Jersey bank
that markets and sells certificates of deposit to help college students finance their
educations sued a Florida agency under the Lanham Act for false advertising
concerning the State's own tution savings plans. The Florida agency asserted
sovereign immunity.36 9 Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court held that the federal
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act did not abrogate Florida's sovereign
immunity and overruled the constructive waiver doctrine found in Parden v.
Terminal P, Co. of Alabama Docks Department.370 In closing, Justice Scalia
defended state sovereign immunity, specifically, and federalism, generally, with an
assertion that "constitutional tradition and precedent" supported the Court's
construction of the Eleventh Amendment. 37 ' The "legislative flexibility" approach
to
to federalism in Justice Breyer's dissent, Justice Scalia noted, was inadequate 372
constrain federal legislative authority and thus inadequate to preserve federalism.
"Congressional flexibility is desirable, of course - but only within the bounds of
federal power established by the Constitution," Justice Scalia wrote. 373 "Beyond
those bounds (the theory of our Constitution goes), it is a menace. 374

365

Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

366

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

367

Id. at 569 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

368

527 U.S. 666 (2000).

369

Id. at 671.

370

Id. at 680 (overruling Parden,377 U.S. 184 (1964)).

371

Id. at 688.

372

Id. at 690. Although both he and Justice Scalia appealed to history and practice, Justice Breyer's

dissent took an evolutionary approach to federalist theory and contended that the basic objective of
federalism, "the protection of liberty," was best served by legislative flexibility that could meet the needs of a
changing political landscape. Id. at 702-703 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
373

Id. at 690.
Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000

51

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 103, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 103:19

Also, in Printz v. United States,375 Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court
relied upon a federalism principle - dual sovereignty - to invalidate portions of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. The Brady Act required state and local
law enforcement officials to conduct background checks of prospective handgun
purchasers.376 Conceding that the text was ambiguous on the precise question at
issue, his opinion considered history (from The Federalistto the early Congresses
to the Wilson Administration), 77 structure, and precedent to conclude that the
division of power between
the state and federal governments prohibited these
378
portions of the Brady Act.
Indeed, Justice Scalia noted similar federalism concerns in a terse separate
379 which allowed Puerto Rico
opinion in Puerto Rico v. Branstad,
to request
delivery of a fugitive from Iowa pursuant to the Extradition Act of 1793. Scalia
implied that a different case might have been presented if the parties "asserted the
lack of power of Congress to require extradition from a State to a Territory."8 0
Although his reference to, and explanation of, tradition in the federalism cases is
muted, they necessarily embrace the notion that historically recognized and
practiced norms inform the structure and meaning of the Constitution.
One criticism of Justice Scalia's view from advocates of the unwritten
Constitution, is that he becomes so enamored with democratic institutions as proper
agents of social and political change that he becomes preoccupied with the problem
of judicial review. 38' The basis of this criticism is most dramatically demonstrated
in Virginia38 2 and Romer,3 3 Professor Hittinger describes this problem as one of
excessive eagerness "to close off every path of judgment beyond the text of the

375

521 U.S. 898 (1997).

376

See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994).

Printz,521 U.S. at 907-18. Justice Scalia's invocation of The Federalist is particularly interesting,
for it drew several critical responses from Justice Souter in dissent. As Justice Scalia read Publius, Congress
could not "impose these responsibilities [conscripting state officials to administer certain laws] without the
consent of the States." Id. at 910-11. Arguing to the contrary that the federal government could require
action of state "auxiliaries," Justice Souter claimed that "the most straightforward reading of No. 27 is
authority for the Government's position here, and ... this reading is both supported by No. 44 and consistent
with Nos. 36 and 45." Id.at 971 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 174-77 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the national
government's authority); id.No. 36, at 217-24 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the national government's
power of taxation); id.No. 44, at 280-88 (James Madison) (discussing both the Necessary and Proper and
Supremacy clauses); id No. 45, at 288-94 (James Madison) (responding to fears that a strong central
government will emerge to consume state power).
378
Printz, 521 U.S. at 933.
377

379

483 U.S. 219, 231 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

380

See id.

381

See Introduction,supranote 25, at xxi.

382

See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 569 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

383

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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positive law of the Constitution."m Hittinger feels "that [judges] can fall
inadvertently into a kind of operational positivism, or at least into a myopia that
narrows constitutional order to the problem of judicial conduct and theories about
,,
it. 3

Granted, as Professor Hittinger notes, the courts have some responsibility
for creating this myopia, or at least for creating the circumstances that tend to
produce it.3 Nevertheless, the criticism suggests that justice should follow the
prudent course and avoid the vice of excess that would leave judges free to make
jurisprudence a subterfuge for the importation of abstract, private moral judgment
divorced from experience. Another vice to be avoided is one of deficiency, which
would abandon the unwritten constitution in favor of a regime where "once it is
determined that the Constitution leaves ajudgment to the political branches or state
governments, the only remaining rule is the fiat (or preferences) of the majority or
the fiat of the individual," which is also divorced from the lamp of experience. 8 7
It is important to note the significant distinctions then, between Justice
Scalia's unwritten Constitution of tradition (should he choose to follow it
consistently) and the unwritten Constitution of Justice Brennan and others, which
represents the "Living Constitution., 388 The "Living Constitution" is best defined
by comparing Justice Scalia's views and those of Brennan, which Scalia has
arguably inveighedas 9 Whatever the merits of the "Living Constitution," it is
undeniably different in substance from the unwritten Constitution that governs
Justice's Scalia's constitutional order.
Both Justice Brennan's and Justice Scalia's methodologies embrace
written and unwritten norms that, in Calhoun's words, "spring from the bosom of
the community."' 39 0 For Justice Brennan, those norms are not preserved for each
384

See Introduction,supranote 25, at xxi

3a5

Id.

386

Id. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding an unenumerated right to

privacy in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights).
387
Introduction,supranote 25, at xxi.
382

See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (stating that the

plurality's was not "the living charter that I have taken to be our Constitution").
Cf Ronald D. Rotunda, Interpretingan Unwritten Constitution, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 15
(1989) (describing the unwritten Constitution as one that "encompasses those rights and freedoms thought by
many people, particularly judges, to be basic to our democratic way of life, but which are not explicitly
defined by the written document"). Professor Rotunda capably argues that academics should try to "divert

the Court away from the uncharted expanse of the 'unwritten Constitution."' Id. at 22. His understanding of
the unwritten Constitution, however, and the one that he urges academics and judges to resist, is more akin to
the "Living Constitution" that Justice Brennan espouses; it is not the unwritten Constitution that encompasses
centuries of custom, convention, and continuity, producing both rights and duties in the body politic. See
RIGHTS AND DUTIES, supranote 5, at 4.
389
See generally A MATTER OF INERPRETATION, supranote 17, at 41-47 (stating his objections to the
"Living Constitution"). Justice Scalia argues that the "Living Constitution" possesses no guiding principle.
Id.at 44-45. The same charge, however, cannot be leveled against the unwritten Constitution, which uses
tradition as its guiding principle.
390

See CALHOUN, supra note 5, at 79. See also Saphire, supra note 22, at 279 (stating that Justices
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generation, thus imposing upon future generations an obligation to innovate only
gradually. 39' Rather, as Brennan writes, "[o]ur Constitution was not intended to
preserve a pre-existing society but to make a new one, to put in place new
principles that the prior political community had not sufficiently recognized., 392 As
Professor Hittinger explains, Justice Brennan's telos is "the remaking of society
generation by generation ....This method does not exhibit a subtle interplay of
written and unwritten constitutions. Instead, the written Constitution is the occasion
for, and not the norms of, judgments in favor of social change. 393
Liberating the individual from society, then, becomes the practical effect
of Justice Brennan's methodology, which is suspicious of relying upon republican
institutions to effectuate meaningful change but confident of the judiciary's unique
capacity to protect rights because it is unobstructed by majoritarian politics or
practical concerns about incumbency. 9" What appears most striking in the
comparison, though, is that the "Living Constitution" does not recognize the
intrinsic value of civil social order, which is comprised of the inherent tension
between the claims of liberty and the claims of authority. 395 Rather, "since society
is merely 'facilitative' of individual choices and well-being, when individual rights
are at stake the government
may not appeal to the inherent goods of society as a
'3
compelling interest. , 9
Another critical distinction between the unwritten Constitution of tradition
and the "Living Constitution" is an epistemological one, regarding the origin of
constitutional values. Both constitutions do embrace the values of constitutional
heritage.397 Indeed, it is clear that Justice Brennan's jurisprudence recognizes the

Brennan and Scalia, despite being "very different kinds ofjudges," shared common personal traits).
391
See William J.Brennan Jr., The Constitution of the United States: ContemporaryRatification, 27
S. Tax. L. REv. 433 (1986). Justice Brennan's piece was based on a speech he delivered at Georgetown
University on October 12, 1985.
392
Id. at 438.
393

Introduction,supranote 25, at xxiii.

394

See MARION, supra note 156, at 434.

See Introduction, supra note 25, at xxv ("[t]he liberal differs from the conservative most deeply on
the question of whether the social order has inherent value. Thus, Brennan regards the great drama of
constitutional history as the struggle between the individual and the power of society (most potently
expressed in the law of the state).").
396
Id. Cf A MATTER OF INERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 41- 42 (concluding that the "Living
395

Constitution" actually does not facilitate social change, though it purports to do so). Justice Scalia writes,
the future agenda of constitutional evolutionists is mostly more of the same - the
creation of new restrictions upon democratic government, rather than the elimination of
old ones. Less flexibility in government, not more .... No, the reality of the matter is
that, generally speaking, devotees of The Living Constitution do not seek to facilitate
social change but to prevent it.
Id.at 42.
Compare RIGHTS AND DUTIES, supra note 5, at 4, with Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. I10,
139 (1989) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (explaining that the Due Process Clause "would seem an empty promise

397

if it did not protect [traditional interests]").
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values of history and tradition. 39 His appeal to those values, however, (1) is
expressed at a much higher level of abstraction; and (2) must be subordinated to the
Constitution's primary value of enabling human beings maximum opportunity to
determine the nature and bounds of their own existence, even where that selfdetermination does not accord with the complex web of practices and beliefs that
are expressed in the body politic's legal and juridical traditions 99 Thus, whereas
the unwritten Constitution to which Justice Scalia is linked discerns constitutional
values in experience (concretely and in historical context)4co Justice Brennan's
"Living Constitution" discerns those values from abstraction based on principles of
justice, dignity, and egalitarianism, and is unlinked to particular customs, habits,
and mores
of the political community that brought the Constitution into
401
existence.
One is left then to wonder of these principles: are these values the judge's
own? If not, how is one to be sure that these values belong to society? The "Living
Constitution" thus poses an epistemological question for itself that can only be
answered (consistently) with mere Cartesian rationalism, i.e., by reference to
abstract theorizing about the nature of rights. Such rationalism represents the very
epistemological criticism of the "Living Constitution.'" 2 As Justice Scalia explains
the criticism, "[t]here is no such philosophizing in our Constitution, which, unlike
the Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, is a
practical and pragmatic charter of government." 40 3
B.

The Unwritten Constitutionand the Problem ofLiberty

Among the criticisms of Justice Scalia's unwritten Constitution (and one
likely to come from adherents to the "Living Constitution") is that it insufficiently

398

See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (agreeing

to uphold a New York property tax exemption for churches). In Walz, Justice Brennan, citing the long history
of providing property tax exemptions for places of worship, stated:
[tI]he existence from the beginning of the Nation's lifeof a practice, such as tax
exemptions for religious organizations, is not conclusive of its constitutionality. But
such practice is a fact of considerable import in the interpretation of abstract
constitutional language.... The more longstanding and widely accepted a practice, the
greater its impact upon constitutionalinterpretation. History is particularlycompelling
in the present case because of the undeviating acceptance given religious tax
exemptions from our earliest days as a Nation.
Id. (emphasis added).

399

See MARION, supra note 156, at 104. As Professor Marion explains, for Brennan "[o]nce freedom

to shape a way of life for oneself becomes the core of dignified existence, all other consideration of a
political, economic, or religious nature can only have a secondary status.' Id.
400

See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 95-96 (1990) (stating that "venerable and

accepted tradition[s] ... are themselves the stuffout of which the Court's principles are to be formed.").
401

See Introduction,supranote 25, at xxiv-xxvi.

402

See Chow, supranote 10, at 775-77.

403

A MAT-ER OF INERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 134.
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protects liberty. 404 The response to this criticism is that the unwritten Constitution
embraces liberty, where liberty is a product of the organic development and
circumstances of a political community. 405 Indeed, a tolerable political community
is marked by a high degree of liberty.4 o Without liberty, the community devolves
into totalitarianism. 0 7 In Professor Moore's words, "in any society that cares about
liberty, you cannot go very far down the road of making everyone conform to
prevalent mores simply because they are prevalent without losing far too much
liberty to be tolerated. 405
But, as Professor Kirk explains, liberty without order is no better than
violence. 40 9 The unwritten Constitution, like the written one, cautions against
extremes of liberty, which dangerously extract rights from legitimate power in
favor of abstract rationalism. The unwritten Constitution favors Burke's message:
The extreme of liberty (which is its abstract perfection, but its real
fault) obtains nowhere, nor ought to obtain anywhere; because
extremes, as well all know, in every point which relates either to
our duties or satisfactions in life, are destructive both to virtue and
enjoyment. Liberty, too, must be limited to be possessed. The
degree of restraint it is impossible in any case to settle precisely.
But it ought to be the aim of every wise public counsel to find out
by cautious experiments, and rational, cool endeavors, with how
little, not how much, of this restraint the community can subsist;
for liberty is a good to be improved, and not an evil to be
lessened.410

The "Living" Constitutionalists would do well to heed Burke's cautions. And if he
is to be faithful to the unwritten Constitution's balance between liberty and
authority (which counsels more respect for liberty than mere blind deference to
political majorities), so too would Justice Scalia.
C.

The Unwritten Constitutionand the Problem of Change

Nor, contrary to another able criticism (invoked by, among others, Judge
Bork) that fears the perpetuation of undesirable traditions,411 is the unwritten
404

See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 20, at 98.

405

See RooTs OF AMERICAN ORDER, supranote 3, at 387-88.

406

See id. at 6.

407

See id. at 6-7.

408

Moore, supra note 60, at 272.

4D9

See ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER, supra note 3, at 6.

410

Burke, supra note 80, at 243.

411

See, e.g., BORK, supranote 127, at 235. Judge Bork argues that "not all traditions are admirable,
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Constitution hostile to change, which must, as Burke noted, ultimately preserve
US.412 That the past has an authoritative claim upon us is no reason to defer
uncritically and absolutely to past practices, particularly when a political
community determines that such practices were pernicious or otherwise
inconsistent with what a tolerable order requires.4 13 Granted, determining what
constitutes a "tolerable order" is no easy task (indeed, it poses a real difficulty for
the tradition-based approach to jurisprudence), particularly where those charged
with making that determination and governing that order will do so within the
context of tradition itself. In other words, can tradition alone really tell us what is
"tolerable" in our political order?
The response is that traditions, like the communities they form, are
products of collective reason (as opposed to mere private rationalism and on which
there are admittedly limits and imperfections).414 Traditions enable one to recognize
man's imperfect nature, as well as the complex, often costly and tragic, nature of
political life.41 5 The political community will therefore go beyond tradition (though
and none of them confines judges to any particular range of results." 1d. See also ELY, supra note 20, at 60
(citing the problems with properly identifying traditions).
See REFLECTIONS, supra note 4, at 21 ("[a] state without the means of some change is without the
means of its conservation."); Edmund Burke, Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe, in EDMUND BURKE,
SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 288, 316-317 (Peter J. Stanlis, ed., Regnery Publishing, 1963)(1792).
Burke's letter regarding the Roman Catholics in Ireland explained:
We must all obey the great law of change. It is the most powerful law of Nature, and
the means perhaps of its conservation. All we can do, and that human wisdom can do, is
to provide that the change shall proceed by insensible degrees. This has all the benefits
which may be in change, without any of the inconveniences of mutation. Everything is
provided for as it arrives. This mode will, on the one hand, prevent the unfixing of old
interests at once: a thing which is apt to breed a black and sullen discontent in those
who are at once dispossessed of all their influence and consideration. This gradual
course, on the other side, will prevent men long under depression from being intoxicated
with a large draught of new power, which they always abuse with a licentious insolence.
But, wishing as I do, the change to be gradual and cautious, I would, in may first steps,
lean rather to the side of enlargement than restriction.
Id.
See also POLITICS OF PRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 24 (reminding that "permanence and change
must be recognized and reconciled in a vigorous society."). Professor Kirk explains that, "Change is
essential to the body social ... just as it is to the human body. A body that has ceased to renew itself has
begun to die." Id at 25.

412

Consider, for example, the practices of slavery and segregation. As Justice Scalia has noted,
neither of these was a venerable, unchallenged tradition. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S.
62, 95 n. 1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, each was a widespread and (in a particular region)
generally accepted practice.
414
See Canavan, supra note 4, at 45. See also ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER, supra note 3, at 362
413

(distinguishing reason (with a small "r") from Reason, which is purely rational). Cf. Moore, supranote 60, at
266-69 (explaining Burke's suspicion of the strength of individual reason (as opposed to collective reason),
particularly regarding rights and good government, but that reason nonetheless can be a guide in moving
away from pernicious traditions). The distinction between collective reason and private rationality is thus an
important one, for "[tiheindividual is foolish, but the species is wise. " POLITICS OF PRUDENCE, supra note
4, at 19 (emphasis added).
415

See MARION, supra note 156, at 166 (noting that Madison and others of the founding generation
recognized the complexity of human affairs and political life, and explaining that ajurisprudence that fails to
recognize the tragedy of political existence will compromise the government's ability to govern the people).
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still guided by it), by combining the wisdom of right reason - including principles
(to which the traditionalist is not at all opposed) of justice, liberty, and decency with the community's own collective experiences to determine the norms that
ought to prevail as that community engages in necessary reform.416 Tradition thus
becomes, as Burke noted of jurisprudence itself, "'the collected reason of ages,
combining 4 the
principles of original justice with the infinite variety of human
17
concerns."'

Participants in a complex and socially-constructed political community
therefore must understand that the community will not be perfected, merely
improved (hopefully), by reform. The unwritten Constitution that Burke embraced
thus merely urges that reform be cautious, sagacious, and mindful of the lessons of
experience. 418 To be sure, the unwritten Constitution, unlike the "Living
Constitution," does not affirmatively facilitate change for its own sake. Nor,
however, does it deny that a tolerable constitutional order requires its participants
constantly to achieve some degree of reform and renewal within prescribed modes
of collective action.41 9

In this way, tradition can be viewed as an icon, rather than as an idol or a
token.420 Professor Pelikan uses this analogy in his remarkable vindication of
tradition. An idol, according to Pelikan, embodies the thing it represents, "but it
directs us to itself rather than beyond itself.'' 421 A token, by contrast, points beyond
itself but does not embody what it represents.422 An icon, on the other hand,

See Gottlieb, supra note 21, at 221 n.3 (explaining that "particular principles blended with
caution" enables change to occur within a construct of Burkean traditionalism).
417
REFLECTIONS, supra note 4, at 95. See also Canavan, supra note 4, at 45 (explaining Burke's
416

connection of tradition and reason).
418
See REFLECTIONS, supra note 4, at 33. "A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish
temper and confined views." Burke explained. "People will not look forward to posterity who never look
backward to their ancestors.... the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of conservation, and a sure
principle of transmission; without at all excluding a principle of improvement." Id. See also Gottlieb, supra
note 21, at 221 n.3 (explaining Burkean traditionalism's amenability to change as requiring "particular
principles blended with caution").
419
See The Unwritten Constitution, supra note 355, at 60-61. Justice Scalia's preference for
republican (or democratic) decision-making is consistent with this principle, although, as Professor Hittinger
explains, that preference may tend to devolve into mere "operational positivism." See Introduction, supra
note 25, at xxi.
This notion of incremental change also is consistent with the view that the Second Justice Harlan
expressed in Miranda and the reapportionment cases. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 524 (1966)
(Harlan, J. dissenting) (describing the advantages of state legislative reform and urging the restoration of
criminal justice reform "to those forums where it truly belongs"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 334 (1962)
(Harlan, J. dissenting) (arguing that a legislature should be able to select lawmaking structures that best fits
"the interests, temper, and customs, of its people"). See also Broughton, supra note 106, at 97-104
(comparing Justice Scalia's and Justice Harlan's methodologies and their respective preferences for
republican institutions).
420
See PELIKAN, supra note 10, at 55.
421

Id.

422

Id.
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is what it represents; nevertheless, it bids us to look at it, but
through it and beyond it, to that living reality of which it is an
embodiment. Tradition qualifies as an icon . ..

when it ...

present[s]itself as the way that we who are its heirs must follow if
we are to go beyond it - through it, but beyond it - to a universal

truth that is available only in a particular embodiment, as life
itself is available to each of us only in a particular set of parents.423
Professor Pelikan's defense of tradition is not, therefore, to be understood as an
excuse. Rather, it is a "summary, a restatement, and a recovery of some of the
deepest elements in the tradition itself. ' 424 The voices within our traditions may be
many, they may be diverse, and they may speak with a voice often hostile to
tradition itself.4 25 Those voices, however, remind us of the virtue of living
traditions: "the capacity to develop, while still maintaining its identity and
continuity."426
This conception of incremental change forged in the furnace of experience
guided by right reason is not foreign to Justice Scalia, although there is some
question about the extent to which his jurisprudence of tradition enables society to
change. In Virginia, Justice Scalia lamented the Court's intrusion into VMI's
admissions process because such intrusion "forced" Virginia to change and at the
same time would chill future democratic decisions to change past practices.427 In
the capital punishment cases, Justice Scalia clearly embraced the search for
"evolving standards of decency" and the accompanying search for changes in
democratic legislative practices that would signal society's changing view of
punishments.428
At the same time, however, the affirmative action cases provide a powerful
example of Scalia's resistance to democratic change where those efforts to reform
society, even if well-meaning, are based on race.429 Thus, Justice Scalia's writing
423

Id. at 55-56.

424

Id. at 57.

See id at 57-58. See also Balkin, supra note 156, at 1614-29 (arguing that tradition never speaks
with a single voice).
426
PELIKAN, supra note 10, at 58.
425

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[t]hese traditions may
of course be changed by the democratic decisions of the people, as they largely have been. Today, however,
change is forced upon Virginia, and reversion to single-sex education is prohibited nationwide, not by
democratic processes but by order of this Court.").
428
See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-373 (1989) (reviewing "enduring" state
legislative and jury sentencing practices regarding the imposition of capital punishment upon those who
committed their crimes while minors and concluding that the petitioners could not establish a national
consensus in their favor).
429
See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-21 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (expressing the view that the Constitution is color-blind and that state efforts to
discriminate based on race cannot survive constitutional challenge except in certain limited situations
involving a "social emergency").
427
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reflects an expressed, but nonetheless ambiguous and perhaps incomplete, vision of
social change in a constitutional system guided by tradition. In this regard, his
amenability to change is a weaker element of his Burkeanism and of his unwritten
constitutionalism than is his reverence for tradition (which is arguably the strongest
element of his Burkeanism and unwritten constitutionalism)
D.

The Unwritten Constitution and the Problem ofNaturalLaw

A final criticism regarding claims about the unwritten Constitution of
tradition comes from the conservative camp of which Justice Scalia is generally a
part.430 Some feel that the unwritten Constitution gives license to the judiciary to
ignore the written text in favor of an appeal to extra-constitutional
sources, i.e., the
31
familiar preference of natural law to positive law?

Indeed, one may suggest quite persuasively that Justice Scalia's own
textualism and positivism raise this problem and discount the role of natural law in
constitutional adjudication. 32 Professor Kirk responds to this argument. According
to Kirk, the Framers, who were well versed in natural law theories, did not give us
a natural law document (made evident by their opposition to abstract
430

The question of whether Justice Scalia is actually a conservative has arisen elsewhere in this

article, and, presumably, will continue to rage. At any rate, see SAVAGE, supra note 21, at 55 (describing
Justice Scalia's conservative credentials). But see Young, supra note 21, at 623 (arguing that Justice Scalia is
not a Burkean conservative).
431
For an explanation of the problem see generally Russell Hittinger, Liberalism and the NaturalLaw
Tradition, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV.429 (1990). The instant article is, of course, not designed to provide a
comprehensive analysis of natural law theory. For excellent discussions of natural law, however, see
generally ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER, supra note 3; LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE
(1987); JOHN FiNNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
Of course, much of the problem begins with the definition and origin of natural law. As Professor
Kirk explains, there are various sources and conceptions of natural law: from divine commandment, right
reason given by God, human nature "empirically regarded," abstract Reason, or "from the long experience of
humankind in community." Russell Kirk, NaturalLaw and the Constitutionof the United States, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1994) (hereafter NaturalLaw). Of these, we may say the unwritten Constitution
generally follows a conception of natural law having its roots in the experiences of various human
communities. See id.at 1047.
Also of importance to this question is the distinction between natural law and natural rights. See,
e g.. Michael P. Zuckert, Do NaturalRights Derive From NaturalLaw?, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 695,
731 (1997)(providing an excellent account of Thomistic natural law theory, contrasting it with Lockean
natural rights theory, and concluding that natural rights do not derive from natural law); Kirk, NaturalLaw.
supra this note, at 1037 (stating that natural rights may or may not follow from natural law, but do not do so
necessarily).
432
See Chow, supra note 10, at 816 (arguing that while critical pragmatists combine elements of
natural law and positive law, prudential pragmatists like Justice Scalia do not; rather, Justice Scalia relies on
positive law for the source of legal norms). Perhaps, here, Professor Chow assumes that natural law and
natural rights are synonymous. If so, it is easy to see why Justice Scalia would reject such a normative basis
for law. If one assumes that natural rights are distinct from natural law, and that natural law is understood as
the web of beliefs that stem from the long experience of humankind, see Natural Law, supra note 431, at
1036, then perhaps Justice Scalia can be understood as seeing natural law as a normative basis for positive
law. Cf Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural Law Originalism - Or Why Justice Scalia (Almost) Gets It Right, 20
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627, 652 (1997) (comparing the virtues of natural law theory to those that Justice
Scalia embraces, such as serving as a "check upon the very judicial creation of novel rights that Justice Scalia
laments.").
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philosophizing in a practical document of governance); 433 instead, positive law
dominates our constitutional scheme. Professor Kirk argues, therefore, that the
Constitution embodies the inspirational relationship between that positive law and
the natural law, charting a sort of middle course between the extremes. 434 "What the
natural law provides," he argues, "is the authority for positive law, not an
alternative to positive law." 435 If natural law were meant to serve as a substitute for
the positive law and its institutional decision-makers, it would, according to
Professor Hittinger's interpretation of Kirkean theory, then "speak with a forked
tongue, guiding men to actions in accord with the common good (including the
creation of a system of positive law), while providing justification
' 36 for jettisoning
those very actions, laws, and institutions meant to secure that end. 4
It is not clear whether Justice Scalia subscribes to Professor Kirk's view.
But despite his evident positivism and textualism, Justice Scalia's reverence for
tradition, and his particular unwritten constitutionalism to which tradition is so
intimately connected, suggest that he may. 37 Indeed, to recognize the inspirational
relationship between positive law and natural law, between the lex scripta and the
particular traditions that gave rise to it, is to reaffirm the persuasiveness of the dual
answer that Justice Scalia gave to his own question about the existence of an
unwritten Constitution. 36
V.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps in Justice Scalia's jurisprudence of tradition there is a devotion not
merely to the norms described in the text of the Constitution, but also to unwritten
norms that serve as the basis to find meaning in those words, or in other words, to
give them context and content. Importantly, in his devotion to tradition as well as
text, Justice Scalia's unwritten Constitution recognize the realities of living in a
political community. Madison recognized those realities himself, understanding
that popular government carries costs - the threat of majority tyranny and "the
inefficiencies of coalitional politics '439 - that are "inescapable but, under proper

433

Natural Law, supra note 43 1, at 1039.

434

Id. at 1045.

43

Id. at 1047.
436
Introduction,supra note 25, at xxvi-xxvii. See also Rotunda, supra note 388, at 21 (stating that
"[elven proponents of a 'natural law' theory of the Constitution appreciate that there must be some limitations
to judicial power."). Indeed, the positive law - the written Constitution - sets forth these limitations.
437
See Russell Hittinger, The NaturalLaw in the PositiveLaws, 55 REv. POL. 5, 22 (1993) ("there is
nothing contradictory in arguing, on the one hand, for a natural law basis of government, and indeed of
positive law itself, while at the same time holding that judges ought, whenever possible, to be 6ound by
written law.").
438

See UnwrittenConstitution,supra note 24, at 1.

439

See MARION, supra note 156, at 166.
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management, tolerable costs."" In like fashion, Justice Scalia practices a
constitutional jurisprudence that, unlike the "Living Constitution," largely accepts
the imperfections of our political system and, as Professor Marion aptly describes
it, the complex, socially-constructed, and often tragic nature of political life." 1
Still, it would be foolish to deny the problems that inhere in a methodology
that relies upon past practices, problems of identifying the existence of such
practices, and subsequently, of defining the precise level of generality at which to
ascribe constitutional import. But it would be equally foolish to assert that the
constitutional text can be understood without considering the particular
circumstances, customs, mores, and experiences of those who planted those words
in our constitutional ground. The unwritten Constitution recognizes the experience
that inspired the planting of those seeds, the traditions drawn from ancient
civilizations, from our medieval predecessors, and from the various political
communities that shaped the early development of American law and American
institutions.
Those traditions cannot solve every problem this nation, this Republic, will
face. Nor must these traditions be permitted to prevent the Republic's growth and
development toward a more wise, humane, and innovative existence. What they
offer this Republic, however, is an understanding of who we are, from where we
have come, and what lessons we have learned from our collective experience. The
unwritten Constitution of tradition thus, above all, helps to promote order in the
Republic, balancing the needs for freedom and improvement with society's identity
and the continuity that preserves it.

440

See id. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (explaining the difficulties

inherent in popular government). Madison wrote eloquently:
[blut what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If
men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next
place, oblige it to control itself.
Id. (emphasis added).
441
See MARION, supranote 156, at 166.
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